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Automatic threat detection is an increasingly important area in X-ray security imag-
ing since it is critical to aid screening operators to identify concealed threats. Due
to the cluttered and occluded nature of X-ray baggage imagery and limited dataset
availability, few studies in the literature have systematically evaluated the automated
X-ray security screening. This thesis provides an exhaustive evaluation of the use
of deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) for the image classification and de-
tection problems posed within the field. The use of transfer learning overcomes the
limited availability of the object of interest data examples. A thorough evaluation
reveals the superiority of the CNN features over conventional hand-crafted features.
Further experimentation also demonstrates the capability of the supervised deep
object detection techniques as object localization strategies within cluttered X-ray
security imagery. By addressing the limitations of the current X-ray datasets such
as annotation and class-imbalance, the thesis subsequently transitions the scope to-
wards deep unsupervised techniques for the detection of anomalies based on the
training on normal (benign) X-ray samples only. The proposed anomaly detection
models within the thesis employ a conditional encoder-decoder generative adver-
sarial network that jointly learns the generation of high-dimensional image space
and the inference of latent space — minimizing the distance between these images
and the latent vectors during training aids in learning the data distribution for the
normal samples. As a result, a larger distance metric from this learned data dis-
tribution at inference time is indicative of an outlier from that distribution — an
anomaly. Experimentation over several benchmark datasets, from varying domains,
shows the model efficacy and superiority over previous state-of-the-art approaches.
Based on the current approaches and open problems in deep learning, the thesis
finally provides discussion and future directions for X-ray security imagery.
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X-ray security screening is widely used to maintain aviation and transport security.
It poses a significant image-based screening task for human operators reviewing
compact, cluttered and highly varying baggage contents within limited time-scales.
The increased passenger throughput, in the global travel network, and the increased
focus on broader aspects of extended border security (e.g., freight, shipping, postal)
results in a challenging automated image classification task.
A considerable amount of literature has been published on X-ray security sys-
tems [17, 18]. With a great deal of the previous research within the field has fo-
cused on screening systems [19–23]. It was, however, not until the early 2010s that
computer-aided X-ray security screening, in terms of prohibited item and threat ob-
ject detection, attracted sufficient scholarly attention [17, 18]. Despite the study of
automated X-ray security imaging gaining momentum recently, there are still signif-
icant research challenges remaining for both the detection of threat objects and also
anomalous occurrences within such cluttered and complex X-ray security imagery.
This thesis aims to contribute to this growing area of research by exploring both
supervised and unsupervised learning algorithms to design state-of-the-art object
detection systems that can operate in real-time.
1
Figure 1.1: Exemplary X-ray baggage image from multiple-views.
The first part of the thesis focuses on deep supervised learning techniques to clas-
sify and localize the threat objects from X-ray images (Chapter 3). The rest of the
thesis, on the other hand, concentrates more on unsupervised learning approaches,
due to highly imbalanced X-ray datasets (Chapter 4 and 5).
1.1 Motivation
X-ray security screening is one of the most widely used security measures to ensure
the airport and transport security. Human operators play a vital role to screen
thousands of bags each day, a non-trivial task in terms of assured threat detec-
tion accuracy. In manual X-ray security imagery by human operators, experience
and knowledge are critical to effectively overcoming difficulties during testing [24].
Even though experienced and more knowledgeable screeners are more confident than
novice screeners to assess X-ray security imagery bags, they both need diagnostic
aid for challenging cases [25]. Besides, although training and experience could im-
prove screener knowledge and skills, their actual job performance highly depends
on external factors such as emotional exhaustion and job satisfaction [26–28]. Be-
sides, measures used to evaluate the visual inspection performance of the screeners
do not always reflect the actual performance [29]. Computer-aided systems such as
automated machine learning algorithms showing the exact location of the prohib-
ited items boost operator detection performance and response time as well as higher
operator trust [30].
The complex and cluttered nature of X-ray security imagery makes threat de-
tection a challenging task, and adversely impact human operator decision time and
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detection performance [31–33]. For instance, the threat detection performance of
human screeners significantly reduces when laptops are inside the bags since the
compact structure of laptops conceals potential threats [34, 35]. All of these issues
readily invite the potential for the use of automated object detection algorithms
within X-ray security screening.
Recently, there has been a surge of interest in X-ray screening systems [19–23].
However, automated computer-aided X-ray security image screening is understudied,
particularly due to the lack of data resources, and the need for advanced learning
algorithms to solve the cluttered nature of the task. State-of-the-art studies within
the literature have focused on image enhancement [36–38], segmentation [?, 39, 40],
classification [41–44], detection [42,45–47] and unsupervised anomaly detection [48–
51] tasks in order to further investigate the real-time applicability of these systems
to automate the X-ray security imagery.
Prior surveys such as those conducted by Rogers et al. [18] and Mouton &
Breckon [17] categorize the existing literature within two main categories (i) image
processing and (ii) image understanding. Pioneering work within the field focuses
more on image processing approaches such as image manipulation, image enhance-
ment, threat image projection (TIP), material discrimination and segmentation.
Recent work, on the other hand, has a particular interest in image understanding
focusing more on automated threat detection and automated content verification by
using machine learning algorithms.
Traditionally, a machine learning algorithm pipeline contains pre-processing, en-
hancement, segmentation, feature extraction, and classification stages. Pre-processing
and enhancement stages clean the input data and improve the overall quality of the
images. The segmentation step crops the regions of interests from the full cluttered
image. Feature extraction stage extracts the hand-crafted features of the object,
such as edges and shapes. The final stage classifies the images based on the features
derived from the preceding step.
The main drawback of these machine learning approaches is their dependency on
hand-crafted features requiring manual engineering. Deep neural networks overcome
this issue by learning the features that are specific to the problem domain, which
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overall yields a significant improvement over the previous approaches [52]. A neural
network contains a single or multiple layers, each of which comprises a set of neurons
activations and non-linear transformation. The earlier layers learn high-level features
such as edges and shapes, while higher layers learn lower level features that are more
specific to the image fed into the network [53]. LeCun et al. [54] is considered to
be one of the first successful implementations of a neural network, where the model
classifies the hand-written digits. After AlexNet, proposed by Krizhevsky et al. [7]
that won the 2012 ImageNet object classification challenge [55] by a large margin,
deep neural networks have become the golden standard approach within automatic
scene understanding.
Within the X-ray security imaging, on the other hand, the transition from the
classical machine learning to modern deep learning approaches has not been instant.
This is due to extensive data-driven requirements of deep learning approaches, which
limits its use within the field, where the availability of such large datasets is signif-
icantly limited due to the specialist and security-related nature of the topic. After
transfer learning paradigm is introduced into the field [56], which enables to train
deep models on small datasets by transferring the learned model weights from larger
datasets, the use of deep learning approaches has become feasible to use in X-ray
security imaging [9, 57, 58]. Despite the growing interest and various proposed ap-
proaches, X-ray security imaging is still understudied compared to more general
object recognition literature or applications such as perception for autonomous road
vehicles [59]. The work presented in this thesis goes some way to address these issues
representing both advances in supervised and unsupervised deep machine learning
for the X-ray security image understanding context.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of the thesis are as follows:
• An exhaustive evaluation of conventional hand-crafted features and contempo-
rary end-to-end and feature-space deep learning training for the classification
and detection tasks. (Chapter 3)
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• An unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm based on a novel adversarial
autoencoder within an encoder-decoder-encoder pipeline, capturing the train-
ing data distribution within both image and latent vector space, yielding
both statistically and computationally superior results to contemporary GAN-
based [13,14] and traditional autoencoder-based approaches [60] (Chapter 4).
• A variant unsupervised anomaly detection model, over a skip-connected encoder-
decoder convolutional network architecture and a multi-task discriminator net-
work, which addresses the high-reconstruction error and redundant network
parametrization issues of the previous work, yielding superior reconstruction
within the image and latent vector spaces (Chapter 5).
• An extensive overview of classical machine learning approaches and contem-
porary deep learning algorithms within X-ray security imaging.
1.3 Publications
The work contained within this thesis has been previously published in the following
peer-review publications by the author, and is used in the chapters as indicated
below:
• Transfer Learning using Convolutional Neural Networks for Object
Classification within X-Ray Baggage Security Imagery, S. Akçay, M.
E. Kundegorski, M. Devereux, T.P. Breckon, In Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Conference on Image Processing, IEEE, 2016, pp. 1057-1061. (Con-
tributing to Chapter 3)
• An Evaluation of Region-Based Object Detection Strategies within
X-ray Baggage Security Imagery ,S. Akçay, TP. Breckon, In Proceedings
of the International Conference on Image Processing, IEEE, 2017, pp. 1337-
1341. (Contributing to Chapter 3)
• Using Deep Convolutional Neural Networks for Automated Ob-
ject Detection and Classification within X-ray Baggage Security Im-
agery, S. Akçay, ME. Kundegorski, CG.Willcocks, TP. Breckon, Transactions
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on Information Forensics and Security, IEEE, 2018, pp. 2203-2215. (Con-
tributing to Chapter 3)
• GANomaly: Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection via Adversarial
Training, S. Akçay, A.Atapour-Abarghouei, T.P. Breckon, In Proceedings of
the Asian Conference on Computer Vision ACCV, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, Springer, 2018, pp. 622-637. (Contributing to Chapter 4)
• Skip-GANomaly: Skip Connected, and Adversarially Trained Encoder-
Decoder Anomaly Detection, S. Akçay, A. Atapour-Abarghouei, T.P.
Breckon, In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Neural Net-
works IJCNN, IEEE, 2019, pp. 1-8. (Contributing to Chapter 5)
1.4 Thesis Scope and Structure
This thesis presents a number of topics spanning both supervised and unsupervised
deep machine learning. Chapter 2 thoroughly reviews the X-ray security imaging
literature by categorizing the field based on the machine and deep learning-related
algorithms. In this chapter, machine learning algorithms are divided into image
enhancement, threat image projection, object segmentation, feature extraction, and
object classification algorithms. Likewise, deep learning-based algorithms are re-
viewed based on object classification, detection, and segmentation-based algorithms.
Chapter 3 explores the use of deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) by
comparing the conventional state-of-the-art Bag of Visual Words (BoVW) approach.
Employing a transfer learning paradigm such that a pre-trained CNN, primarily
trained for generalized image classification tasks where sufficient training data ex-
ists, can be optimized explicitly as a later secondary process towards this application
domain demonstrates the superiority of the CNN against BoVW. The chapter fur-
ther explores the use of object detection algorithms within the X-ray security context
and show promising results within the field.
Chapter 4 addresses the class imbalance issue within X-ray security imaging
and proposes an unsupervised anomaly detection algorithm that utilizes encoder-
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decoder-encoder networks with adversarial training, and that outperforms the pre-
vious state-of-the-art anomaly detection algorithms.
Chapter 5 also explores the unsupervised anomaly detection problem within X-
ray security imaging, and proposes a more straightforward pipeline that utilizes more
advanced network architectures, which improves the anomaly detection performance
even further.
Chapter 5 further investigates the high-reconstruction error and parameter re-
dundancy issues of the work presented in Chapter 4, and introduces an unsuper-
vised anomaly detection algorithm by employing an adversarial training with skip-
connected generator and multi-tasked discriminator networks, which overall outper-
forms the previous work.
Chapter 6, the final chapter, draws together the key findings presented within
the previous chapters and provides a discussion based on the strengths and the






This chapter reviews the current X-ray security screening literature by taxonomising
the field into conventional image analysis, traditional machine learning and contem-
porary deep learning approaches. Conventional image analysis section reviews the
early attempts of image enhancement and threat image projection techniques stud-
ied in the field. Similarly, traditional machine learning section reviews the litera-
ture based on the techniques proposed for classification, detection and segmentation
tasks. Finally, for the deep learning-based approaches, the chapter reviews the avail-
able X-ray datasets, classification, detection, anomaly detection and segmentation-
based models. The chapter is concluded by the discussion of the current and future
challenges within the field.
Despite the surge of interest in X-ray screening [19–23], automated computer-
aided screening is understudied, particularly due to the lack of data, and the need
for advanced learning algorithms. State-of-the-art studies within the literature have
focused on image enhancement [36–38], classification [41–44], detection [42, 45–47],
segmentation [?,39,40], and unsupervised anomaly detection [48–51] for automated
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Figure 2.1: Statistics for the recent papers published in X-ray security imaging. Conven-
tional Machine Learning (CML) approaches were dominant in the field before 2016, while
deep learning approaches have recently become the standard approach.
security screening. Notable surveys within the field [17, 18] categorize the exist-
ing literature within two main categories: (i) image processing [36] and (ii) image
understanding [40, 57, 61]. Pioneering work within the field focuses more on im-
age processing approaches such as image enhancement [36], threat image projection
(TIP) [62], material discrimination and segmentation [38]. Recent work, on the other
hand, has a particular interest in image understanding focusing more on automated
threat detection and automated content verification via machine/deep learning al-
gorithms [?, 43, 46, 50,51].
In a traditional setting, a machine learning algorithm pipeline contains pre-
processing, enhancement, segmentation, feature extraction, and classification stages
[17, 18]. Pre-processing and enhancement stages reduce the noise from the input
data and improve the overall quality. The segmentation step crops the regions of
interests from the full cluttered image. Feature extraction stage extracts the hand-
crafted features of the object, such as edges and shapes. The final stage classifies
the objects based on the features derived from the preceding step.
The main drawback of these machine learning approaches is their dependency
on hand-crafted features requiring manual engineering. Deep convolutional neural
networks overcome this issue by learning the task-specific features, which overall
yields a significant improvement. A convolutional neural network contains a single
or multiple layers, each of which comprises a set of neuron activations and non-linear
transformation. The earlier layers learn high-level features such as edges and shapes,
while higher layers learn lower level features that are more specific to the image fed
into the network. Despite being initially proposed more than decades ago [54], the












































Figure 2.2: A Taxonomy of the X-ray security imaging papers.
prevalent especially after achieving state-of-the-art performance [7] on ImageNet
object classification challenge [55] by a large margin.
Within the X-ray security imaging, on the other hand, the transition from the
classical machine learning to modern deep learning approaches was not instant. This
is due to data-hunger nature of deep learning approaches, which initially limited
its use within the field, where the availability of such large datasets is somewhat
limited. With the utilisation of transfer learning paradigm [56] and synthetic data
generation [62], the use of deep learning approaches has become the general approach
within the field [9, 57, 58].
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This literature survey reviews the published work within various computer vision
tasks (Figure 2.1b) in X-ray security screening, with a particular focus on the deep
learning applications. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• taxonomy — an extensive overview of classical machine learning and contem-
porary deep learning within X-ray security imaging.
• datasets — an overview of the large datasets used to train deep learning ap-
proaches within the field.
• open problems — discussion of the open problems, current challenges, and
future directions based on the current trends within computer vision.
The rest of the chapter is as follows: Sections 2.2 and 2.3 explore conventional
image analysis and machine learning algorithms with a specific focus on image en-
hancement, threat image projection, image segmentation, object classification, and
object detection. Section 2.4 reviews the applications of the deep learning algorithms
within X-ray security imaging. Section 2.5 finally concludes the chapter.
2.2 Conventional Image Analysis
A conventional image understanding consists of the following stages: (i) pre-processing
stage that enhances the quality of the input image, (ii) segmentation stage to crop
the region of interests (RoI) from the full image, (iii) feature extraction stage that
computes fundamental attributes of the object such as edges, texture and shape,
(iv) classification stage to predict the corresponding class label based on the ex-
tracted features. This section explores the conventional image analysis techniques
that perform image enhancement and threat image projection.
2.2.1 Image Enhancement
Pre-processing the input data plays a substantial role to yield higher-quality images
that increase the readability by both screener and computer.
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An image enhancement algorithm presented in [36] comprises three stages: A
wavelet transformation to fuses high and low energy X-ray images, (ii) background
subtraction via histograms to reduce the fusion noise and (iii) histogram-based image
enhancement. Qualitative experimentation depicts superior image output than that
of the original X-ray images.
An adaptive enhancement algorithm [64] utilizes a multi-layer perceptron to
predict the most optimum technique for the input image. The model takes an input
of varying viewability measures, a measurement for the images before and after
the enhancement operation, and outputs the most suitable enhancement algorithm.
Adaptively predicting the optimum enhancement is shown to outperforms the use
of fixed enhancement methods.
Another image enhancement algorithm [63] declutters and clusters RoI from
complex X-ray images by an optimum threshold selection, achieved by Radon Trans-
form. In addition to being efficient, the algorithm yields up to 170% general threat
detection improvement compared to the original raw X-ray images and improves
low-density threat detection of human operators by 58%.
The seminal works of [65] and [36] investigate the use of pseudocolouring tech-
niques within X-ray baggage imagery. Application of pseudocolouring to grey-scale
X-ray images improves the detection performance of human operators from 40% to
97% as well as their alertness level. Another set of experimentation reveals that
HSI-based colour mapping techniques are more suited for human perception and
alertness. A similar work [112] enhances threat detection performance within X-ray
imagery by proposing a new colour coding scheme, calibrating the estimation of
effective atomic number (Zeff ) and density information (ρ).
Wobble effect is a severe issue for the X-ray images produced by mobile scanners.
To address this issue, Rogers et al. [66] first quantify the wobble error via the use of
root mean square (RMS) deviations of mobile and static images. The second step
estimates the position of the X-ray beam based on the ground truth, finally fused
with the calculated deviations. A follow-up work [67] proposes a wobble estimator
via Random Regression Forest (RRF) [113], which estimates/calibrates the sensor
activities and corrects the images with wobble artefacts. Experiments report 87%
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improvement on image error that stems from the wobble effect.
2.2.2 Threat Image Projection (TIP)
The detection performance of human screeners is heavily dependent on experience
and knowledge acquired with computer-based training [26, 114, 115]. Due to the
limited availability of X-ray scans with prohibited items, the training is achieved
with the images onto which threat images are synthetically projected (Threat Image
Projection (TIP) [62]).
More recently TIP has also been used for synthetic data generation to address
the data requirements of machine learning models. By projecting a large number of
threat objects onto benign X-ray images, it is possible to gather large datasets that
could train/evaluate machine learning algorithms [68,69].
One of the recent TIP implementations [68] first removes the background from
a threat patch, yielding a binary threat mask. Projection of the binary threat
mask onto the input X-ray image via multiplication finally yields the output X-
ray image with the threat item. To provide robust training to machine learning
algorithms with diverse and realistic image samples, the algorithm utilizes affine
transformations during the projection.
Another TIP study [69] employs logarithmic transformations to separate fore-
ground objects from the background. Subsequently, the threat objects are projected
via multiplication operation since it is empirically shown to achieve superior pro-
jection than that of addition. Another use of the algorithm is the task of object
detection, where a sparse representation algorithm extracts the dictionaries of both
foreground (threat) and background (benign) objects and performs classification,
which yields 93.0%, 99.0%, 98.7% precision, recall, and accuracy, respectively.
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2.3 Machine Learning Approaches in X-ray Secu-
rity Imaging
This section explores the applications of conventional machine learning approaches
in X-ray security imaging. The literature is reviewed based on three tasks: (i)
classification, (ii) detection, and (iii) segmentation. For an alternative perspective
for this section, the reader could refer to the related reviews of Mery [116] and
Rogers et al. [18].
2.3.1 Object Classification
Prior to the dominance of the deep learning within the field, the bag of visual
words (BoVW) approach was prevalent. In of the initial attempts utilising BoVW,
Baştan et al. [77] perform classification of X-ray objects on a relatively limited
dataset. Scale Invariant Feature Transform (SIFT) [117], Speeded Up Robust Fea-
tures (SURF) [118] and Binary Robust Independent Elementary Features (BRiEF)
feature descriptors are computed around the points detected using standard Dif-
ference of Gaussians (DoG), Hessian Laplace, Harris, Features from accelerated
segment test (FAST) and STAR feature detectors. k-means [119] clusters the visual
vocabulary, which is trained with an SVM [120]. DoG detector and SIFT descrip-
tor are shown to perform the best among the descriptors (mAP: 0.65 on 200 X-ray
images.
Inspired by [77], Turcsany et al. [78] presents a unique BoWV approach for
X-ray firearm classification via class-specific feature extraction. With the use of
SURF [118] feature detector and descriptor with a BoVW approach trained on an
SVM [120] classifier achieves 99.07% true positive rate and 4.31% false-positive rate.
A multi-staged approach [82] performs car detection from X-ray images of freight
containers. The method first creates cars vs non-cars image patches from stream-
of-commerce X-ray images. The next step extracts features via image intensity, log
intensity together with basic and oriented images features [121]. The final stage
utilizes Random Forest (RF) [113], achieving 100% detection rate with 1.23% false
alarm rate. A follow-up work [85] detects loads in cargo containers by an RF classifier
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trained with local image moments and oriented basic image features (oBIF) [121],
yielding 99.3 % detection accuracy and 0.7% false positives.
BoVW approach is further employed in [61]. A dictionary is formed for each
class that consists of SIFT [117] feature descriptors of randomly cropped image
patches. Fitting a sparse representation classification to the feature descriptors of
the random test patches yields 95% accuracy for each class and 85% in case of
occlusion. In another BoVW approach in [86, 87], an SVM is trained with local
latent low-level image features extracted from a dataset with 15 different classes,
each of which comprises 100 images (AUC: 80.1%).
Inspired by the various research outcome drawn for the BoVW, Kundegorski et
al. [8] exhaustively evaluate various feature point descriptors within a BoVW-based
image classification task. The combination of FAST-SURF trained with an SVM
classifier [120] is the best performing feature detector and descriptor combination
for a firearm detection task on a large dataset, yielding a statistical accuracy of 0.94
(true positive: 83% and false positive: 3.3%).
Despite the BoVW dominance, other computer vision/machine learning tech-
niques have also been studied for X-ray object classification task—a study [80] aims
at detecting threat items in vehicles using X-ray cargo imagery. The proposed
multi-staged approach (i) initially improves the image quality via normalisation,
denoising, and enhancement, (ii) subsequently performs multi-view alignment and
pseudocolouring (iii) finally classifies the threats via correlating the similarities be-
tween temporally aligned images. Another study by Zhang et al. [81] investigate
the use of joint shape and texture features extracted from superpixel regions of the
input. Training the extracted feature-map with SVM [120] yields 89% classification
accuracy.
Mery et al. [90] utilize structure estimation and segmentation together with a
general tracking algorithm to detect X-ray objects. Another classification pipeline
by Mery et al. [90] (i) extracts features with SIFT [117], (ii) removes redundancy via
RANSAC [122], (iii) sort features based on the difference between two consecutive
frames and (iv) use Mahalanobis distance classifier to predict class labels (P: 70%,
R: 86% 64 X-ray images).
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Similar works [57,95,96,100] exhaustively evaluate various computer vision tech-
niques, with a specific focus on k-nn based sparse representation. A k-means algo-
rithm [119] clusters the features, segmented from input via an adaptive k-means [123]
and extracted via SIFT [117]. During the test, the score for a patch is calculated
based on the closest distance to a neighbour clustered via k-nn classifier [124], achiev-
ing comparable accuracy to deep models on GDXray (94.7% vs. 96.3%).
2.3.2 Object Detection
This section reviews the conventional X-ray object detection models presented in the
literature. Being a challenging task, where the bounding box coordinates and class
labels are to be predicted simultaneously, conventional object detection algorithms
in the literature is relatively limited in the field.
Schmidt-Hackenberg et al. [98] compare the use of visual cortex inspired features
such as SLF-HMAX and v1-like to the standard features such as SIFT [117]. Com-
pared to SIFT, HMAX features are shown to provide superior feature encoding for
BoVW approach trained with SVM [120].
Evaluation works of [79,84] exhaustively investigate the use of BoVW for X-ray
object detection. Evaluating various feature descriptors within a single and multiple-
view imagery for the detection via branch and bound algorithm with structural
SVM classifier [120] shows that (i) combination of SIFT and SPIN achieves the
best detection performance (mAP: 46.1%), and (ii) utilising multi-view improves
the detection (mAP: 66.5%).
Multi-view X-ray imaging improves the performance when rotation and super-
imposition hinder the viewability of the objects from one view [125]. Despite its
computational complexity, multi-view imaging help human operators and machines
to improve the detection performance [84,126].
A general multi-staged approach proposed in the works of [89, 91, 93, 127] (i)
initially performs feature extraction via feature descriptors and k-NN classifier [124],
(ii) matches the key-points for the consecutive images from different views and (iii)
analyse the multiple-views where the key-points of the two successive images are
matched, and their 3D points are formed with structure from motion. After being
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clustered, 3D points are re-projected back to 2D key-points, which are classified by
the k-NN classifier [124]. The best performing approach achieves 95.7% precision,
92.5% recall for 120 X-ray images.
Franzel et al. [99] propose a sliding window detection approach with the use of
a linear SVM classifier [120] and histogram of oriented gradients (HOG) [128]. As
HOG is not fully rotationally invariant, they supplement their approach by detection
of varying orientations. Multi-view integration step fuses the multiple viewpoints
to find the intersection of the true detections, which achieves superior performance
compared to single-view (mAP: 0.645).
2.3.3 Object Segmentation
One of the crucial steps for accurate object classification in conventional image
understanding is the precise object segmentation. The rest of the section explores
various segmentation techniques presented in the literature.
Early work in the field [70, 71] investigates simplistic pixel-based segmentation
with a fixed absolute threshold and region grouping. Sing et al. [39] optimize seg-
mentation parameters to accurately separate cluttered baggage objects. The model
extracts features via complexity estimate, average edge gradient and colour purity
to fine-tune the parameters of a Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) [129] for segmen-
tation. Mapping the features and GMM with a three hidden layer neural network
achieves 88.2% accuracy.
The segmentation algorithm by Ding et al. [72] segments X-ray objects within
three steps: (i) pre-segmentation stage groups nearest neighbour pixels based on
colour texture match, (ii) attributed regional graphs (ARG) represents the objects
in the image, (iii) the fuzzy similarity distance between ARG images yields the
number of layers within the object, segmenting the overlapping regions.
Lu and Conners’ [38] three-stage segmentation approach (i) segments objects
by removing the noise and by determining the ROI, (ii) removes the overlapping
background to accurately compute grey-level and (iii) computes R and L values
that yield the information to detect threats.
Instead of using shape information, Heitz and Chechik [40] estimate chemical
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(attenuation) properties of the objects for the segmentation. The utilisation of
multiple viewpoints improves the estimation accuracy further. Empirical evaluation
demonstrates the method’s superiority to standard image segmentation approaches
(RMS error: 1.15 on 23 X-ray images).
On the assumption that threat items are mostly metallic objects with high atomic
numbers (Zeff ) values, Kechagias-Stamatis et al. [73] utilizes Zeff to detect threat
materials. The authors subsequently make use of morphological operations to dis-
connect the regions of interests and noise filtering for image enhancement. Next, soft
clustering reduces the artefacts of the segmented regions and hard clustering to clus-
ter overlapping objects. Finally, the use of Nearest Neighbor Distance Ratio [130]
matches SURF [117] key-point detector and descriptors, and RANSAC [122] refines
the paired features.
2.4 Deep Learning in X-ray Security Imaging
This section reviews the X-ray security applications utilising deep learning algo-
rithms. By initially introducing the well-established datasets in the field, we explore
the applications for various computer vision tasks such as object classification, de-
tection, segmentation and unsupervised anomaly detection.
2.4.1 Datasets
This section explores X-ray security imaging datasets that are widely used in the
literature.
Durham Baggage Patch/Full Image Dataset
This dataset comprises 15449 X-ray samples with associated false color materials
mapping from dual-energy. Originally, samples have the following class distributions:
494 camera, 1596 ceramic knife, 3, 208 knife, 3192 firearms, 1203 firearm parts, 2390
laptop and 3366 benign images. Several variants of this dataset is constructed for
classification (DBP2 and DBP6) [8,9,42] and detection (DBF2 and DBF6) [42,108].
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GDXray
Grima X-ray Dataset (GDXRAY) [131] comprises 19407 X-ray samples from five
various subsets including castings (2727), welds (88), baggage (8150), natural images
(8290), and settings (152).
The baggage subset is mainly used for security applications and comprises images
from multiple-views. The limitation of this dataset is its non-complex content, which
is non-ideal to train for real-time deployment.
UCL TIP
This dataset comprises 120, 000 benign images, each of which is 16-bit grayscale with
sizes varying between 1920 × 850 and 2570 × 850. The train and test split of the
dataset is 110000 : 10000, where the training images are 256×256 patches randomly
sub-sampled from 110000 images and the test set comprises 5000 benign and 5000
threat images. The threat images are synthetically generated via the TIP algorithm
proposed in [68], where, depending on the application, small metallic threats (SMT)
or car images are projected into the benign samples. With several variants, this
dataset is used in several studies such as [58,101–104,110,111].
SIXray
Collected and released by [43], SIXray dataset comprises 1, 059, 231 X-ray images,
8929 of which are manually annotated for 6 different classes: gun, knife, wrench,
pliers, scissors, hammer, and background. The dataset consists of objects with a
wide variety in scale, viewpoint and especially overlapping, and is first studied in [43]
for classification and localization problems.
Durham Baggage Anomaly Dataset –DBA
This in-house dataset comprises 230, 275 dual energy X-ray security image patches
extracted via a 64×64 overlapping sliding window approach. The dataset contains 3
abnormal sub-classes —knife (63, 496), gun (45, 855) and gun component (13, 452).
Normal class comprises 107, 472 benign X-ray patches, split via 80 : 20 train-test
19
ratio. DBA dataset is used in [49] and [50] for unsupervised anomaly detection.
Full firearm vs Operational Benign –FFOB
As presented in [42, 49, 50], this dataset contains samples from the UK government
evaluation dataset [15], comprising both expertly concealed firearm (threat) items
and operational benign (non-threat) imagery from commercial X-ray security screen-
ing operations (baggage/parcels). Denoted as FFOB, this dataset comprises 4, 680
firearm full-weapons as full abnormal and 67, 672 operational benign as full normal
images, respectively.
2.4.2 Evaluation Criteria
Before listing the performance results of the reviewed papers, it is important to
introduce the various performance metrics used in the field.
Accuracy (ACC) Accuracy is defined as the number of correctly predicted samples
over the total number of predictions, which is mathematically shown as ACC =
(TP + TN)/(TP + TN + FP + FN).
Mean Average Precision (mAP) mAP is defined as the mean of the average
precision, a metric evaluated by the area under the precision and recall curve, where
precision is TP/(TP + FP ), and recall is TP/(FN + TP ).
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Dataset Domain Task # Samples Classes Performance Reference
DBP2 Baggage Classification 19,938 firearm, background ACC: 0.994 [9, 42]
DBP6 Baggage Classification 10,137 firearm, firearm parts, camera, ACC: 0.937 [9, 42]
knife, ceramic knife, laptop
UCL TIP Cargo Classification 120,000 small metallic threat (SMT), car ACC: 0.970 [41,102–104,110,111]
Detection
Anomaly Detection
GDXRay Baggage Classification 19,407 gun, shuriken, razor blade ACC: 0.963 [57,107,132,133]
Detection
DBF2 Baggage Detection 15,449 firearm, background mAP: 0.974 [42,108]
DBF6 Baggage Detection 15,449 firearm, firearm parts, camera, mAP: 0.885 [42,108]
knife, ceramic knife, laptop
PBOD Baggage Classification 9,520 Explosives AUC: 0.950 [134]
MV-Xray Baggage Detection 16,724 Glass Bottle, TIP Weapon, Real Weapon mAP: 0.956 [46]
SASC Baggage Detection 3,250 Scissors, Aerosols mAP: 0.945 [47]
Zhao et al. Baggage Classification 1,600 wrench, pliers, blade, lighter, ACC: 0.992 [106]
knife, screwdriver, hammer
Smiths-Duke Baggage Detection 16,312 gun, pocket knife, mixed sharp mAP: 0.938 [45]
SIXray Baggage Detection 1,059,231 gun, knife, wrench, pliers, mAP: 0.439 [43]
scissors, hammer, background
UBA Baggage Anomaly Detection 230,275 gun, gun part, knife AUC: 0.940 [49,50]
FFOB Baggage Anomaly Detection 72,352 full-weapon, benign ACC: 0.998 [49,50]
Yang et al. Baggage Classification 2,000 wrench, fork, handgun, power bank, ACC: 0.991 [44]
lighter, pliers, knife, liquid, umbrella, screwdriver
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Figure 2.3: An input X-ray image, and the outputs depending on the deep learning task,
(a) classification via ResNet-50 [1], (b) detection with YOLOv3 [2] and segmentation via
Mask RCNN [3]
AUC AUC is the area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating character-
istics (ROC), plotted by the true positive rates and false positives rates.
2.4.3 Classification
The study of [9] is one of the first research applying CNN to X-ray security imagery.
The authors examine the use of CNN via transfer learning to evaluate to what extent
transfer learning helps classify X-ray objects within the problem domain, where the
availability of the datasets is somewhat limited. Freezing AlexNet weights layer
by layer on a two-class (gun vs no-gun) X-ray classification problem shows that
CNN significantly outperforms the BoVW approach (SIFT+SURF), trained with
SVM or RF, even when the layers of the network are all frozen. Another set of
experimentation analyses the use of CNN within a challenging 6-class classification
problem, whose results show a great promise of the use of CNN in the field.
A similar work [58] compares the use of deep learning against conventional ma-
chine learning to classify non-empty cargo containers with cars or SMT. A multi-
stage approach first classifies cargo containers as empty vs non-empty. The sec-
ond stage is the classification of cars from the containers classified as non-empty,
achieved via oBIF + RF. By using UCL TIP dataset, the authors evaluate the of 9
and 19 layers networks [101] that are similar to [7] and [5] and show that even the
worst-performing CNN outperforms conventional machine learning approach (oBIF
+ RF).
A follow-up work [102] further investigates the detection of cars from X-ray cargo
images. A sliding window splits UCL TIP images into patches. Authors then explore
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various features including intensity, oBIF [121], Pyramid of Histogram of Visual
Words (PHOW) [135] and CNN features. Training these features on SVM [120],
RF [113], and soft-max (CNN) shows that an RF classifier trained on the VGG-
18 [5] features extracted from log-transform images achieves the highest performance
(FPR: 0.22%).
Additional work by Jaccard et al. [103] evaluate the impact of input types on
CNN performance by training single-channel raw image and dual-channel data that
contains the raw image and its log-transformed image on VGG [5] variants. The
quantitive analysis demonstrates that VGG-19 model trained from scratch by using
dual-channel raw and log-transformed images outperforms the other variants (AUC:
97%, FPR: 6%).
Rogers et al. [104] explore the use of dual-energy X-ray images for automated
threat detection. Authors investigate varying transformations applied to high-
energy (H) and low-energy(L) X-ray images captured via the dual-energy X-ray
machine. Using UCL TIP dataset, 640,000 image patches are generated via a
256×256 sliding-window. Training this dataset with a fixed VGG-19 network [5] with
varying input channels, including single-channel (H), dual-channel({H,− logH},
{− logH,− logL}) and four-channels ({− logL,L,H,− logH}) shows that dual and
four-channels always achieves superior detection performance compared to their
single-channel variants (ACC: 95%–dual vs 90%–single).
Inspired by the limited availability of X-ray datasets, a three-stage algorithm by
Zhao et al. [106] first classifies and labels the input X-ray dataset via KNN Matting
[136] that uses the angle information of the foreground objects extracted from the
input image. The second stage generates new X-ray objects via an adversarial
network similar to [137]. Additional use of [138] improves the quality of the generated
images. Finally, a small classification network confirms whether the generated image
belongs to the correct class. In a follow-up study, Yang et al. [44] further investigate
the ways to improve the GAN training to produce better X-ray images. Experiments
and evaluation based on Frechet Inception Distance (fiD) score [139] show that the
proposed GAN approach in the paper generates visually superior prohibited items.
Miao et al. [43] introduce a model (CHR) to classify/localize X-ray images from
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SIXray. The model copes with class imbalance and clutter issue by extracting
image features from three consecutive layers, where subsequent layers are upsampled
and concatenated with the previous layers. A refinement function g() removes the
redundant information from the concatenated feature map. The objective of the
work is to minimize the loss of the weighted sum of the classification of the refined
mid-level features from the three consecutive layers ({h(x̃(l−1)n ), h(x̃(l)n ), h(x̃(l+1)n )}).
Training the model with the proposed loss yields 2.13% mAP improvement when
used with ResNet-101 on SIXray (36.01 vs 38.14).
An evaluation work [134] investigates the use of CNN for the task of explosive
detection. An initial stage process the input data by fixing the image size, cropping
the irrelevant background object where Zeff = 0 and applying data augmentation
transformations. Evaluation of random initialization vs pre-training on VGG19 [5],
Xception [140], and InceptionV3 [141] networks shows that randomly initialized
models achieves superior accuracy for binary classification task. To study the impact
of intensity and Z-eff values on the performance, the authors train three VGG-19
networks on both intensity and Z-effective, the intensity only and Z-effective only.
Training the model with only Z-eff is shown to yield the highest accuracy. The final
set of experiments investigates localization via heatmaps and shows that pre-trained
networks achieves superior performance since randomly initialized networks tend to
overfit on small datasets.
Caldwell et al. [41] study the generalization capability of models trained with
different datasets. To investigate this problem, the authors first train a network
with a cargo dataset and evaluate its performance with a test set that also contains
some parcel dataset samples. Quantitative analysis reveals that the performance of
the CNN model is weak when it is tested with the combined dataset. The second
stage combines these two datasets within the training stage, yielding considerable
improvement in the performance of the model. Based on this experimentation,
authors conclude that transferring information between different modalities is chal-
lenging since CNN cannot sufficiently generalize to the unseen target dataset.
24
2.4.4 Detection
After the success of CNN for classification, the work of [108] train sliding-window
based CNN, Faster RCNN [10] and R-FCN [142] models on DBF2/6 datasets for
firearm and multi-class detection problems. Experiments demonstrate that Faster
RCNN [10] with VGG16 [5] yield 88.3% mAP on 6-class DBF6 dataset, while R-
FCN with ResNet-101 achieves the highest performance (96.3 mAP) on 2-class (gun
vs no-gun) on DBF2 dataset.
Similar to [108], another evaluation work [45] explores the performance of F-
RCNN, R-FCN [142] and SSD [143] within single/multi-view X-ray imagery. Uti-
lizing OR-gate detection by merging object detection outputs from individual views
shows that multi-view outperforms that of single-view (0.938 vs 0.798 when trained
with R-FCN and ResNet-101).
Another work [46] utilises multi-view by modifying Faster-RCNN. A multi-view
pooling layer constructs 3D feature 2D extracted from the convolutional layers.
3D region proposal network generates the RoI. Classification and bounding box
prediction is performed after 3D RoI pooling layer. Experiments show that multi-
view yields an improvement compared to single-view imagery (95.56% vs 91.23%).
Liu et al. [47] also performs object detection via YOLOv2 [2] to detect scissors
and aeorosols on SASC dataset. Training YOLO v2 for 6000 iterations yield 94.5%
average precision and 92.6% recall rates with 68 FPS run-time speed.
Motivated by the lack of annotated X-ray datasets, Xu et al. [107], make use
of attention mechanisms for the localization of threat materials. The first stage
forward-passes an input and finds the corresponding class probability. The back-
propagation stage finds which neurons within the network decides the output class.
Using the neurons from the first convolutional layer on top of the input image local-
izes the threat. The final stage refines the activation map by normalizing the layers
with the activations of the previous layer. Comparison against the traditional decon-
volution method (mAP: 34.3%) shows that the proposed method achieves superior
detection (56.6%) without needing for bounding box information.
Similar to [41], generalisation capability of CNN is studied by Gaus et al. [144] by




Human operators tend to perform better detection when focusing on benign objects
rather than threat items. In addition, the knowledge of every-day benign objects
leads to much better detection performance [145]. The same concept is applied in
anomaly detection, where the model is only trained with normal samples, and tested
on normal/abnormal examples.
An anomaly detection approach [48] employs sparse feed-forward autoencoders in
an unsupervised manner to learn the feature encoding of normal and abnormal data.
An SVM [120] then classifies the images either anomalous or benign. Validation on
MNIST [54] and freight container dataset (empty vs non-empty) shows that hidden
layer representation extracted from the autoencoder, in fact, is rather significant for
the detection of abnormalities in the images. When fused with the raw-input and
residual error, features encoding from the hidden layers yield even better detection
performance.
A follow-up work utilizes intensity, log-intensity and VGG-19 [5] features ex-
tracted from patches from UCL TIP dataset and train normal images via a forest of
random split trees anomaly detector [146]. Testing the model on normal + abnormal
data yields 64% AUC.
A similar study [49], in which image and latent vector spaces are optimized for
anomaly detection, utilizes an adversarial network such that the generator comprises
encoder-decoder-encoder sub-networks. The objective of the model is to minimize
the distance between both real/generated images and their latent representations
jointly, which overall outperforms the previous state-of-the-art both statistically
and computationally (UBA: 0.643, FFOB: 0.882 – AUC). A follow-up work [50]
improves the performance of [49] further by (i) utilizing skip-connections in the
generator network to cope with higher resolution images, and (ii) learning the la-
tent representations within the discriminator network (UBA: 0.940, FFOB: 0.903 –
AUC).
Another anomaly detection algorithm [51] (i) first extract the feature of the
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normal images from Inception v3 [147] alike network, (ii) subsequently trains a
multivariate Gaussian model to capture the normal distribution of CAST dataset.
Anomaly score of a test sample is based on its likelihood that is relative to the
model, which overall yields 92.5% AUC.
2.4.6 Segmentation
Due to the scarcity of datasets with pixel-level annotation, the task of segmentation
is understudied within the field. One of the published work [144] addresses segmen-
tation and anomaly detection tasks together, whereby a dual-CNN pipeline initially
segments RoI via Mask RCNN [3] and classifies the regions as benign/abnormal via
ResNet-18 [1], achieving 97.6% segmentation mAP and 66.0% anomaly detection
accuracy. Another work proposes three-stage approach, whereby (i) object-level
segmentation is achieved by the use of Mask RCNN [3], (ii) sub-component regions
are segmented via super-pixel segmentation and (iii) final object classification is
performed via fine-grained CNN classification, which overall yields 97.91% anomaly
detection accuracy on 7, 878 electronic items.
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Reference Domain Problem Method
Akçay et al. [9] Baggage Object Classification CNN with transfer learning
Svec [100] Baggage Object Classification CNN with transfer learning
Andrews et al. [111] Cargo Anomaly Detection Train CNN features with Random Split Trees
Jaccard et al. [58] Cargo Object Classification oBIF+RF for non-empty cargo detection, followed by CNN for car detection
Jaccard et al. [101] Cargo Object Classification CNN from scratch outperforms RF
Rogers et al. [104] Cargo Object Classification Evaluation of high and low energy x-ray imagery
Caldwell et al. [41] Cargo, Baggage Object Classification Transferability between domains
Yuan and Gui [105] Tera Hertz Object Classification Two-stage. Classify from RGB, then Tera-Hertz images.
Zhao et al. [106] Baggage Image Generation, Generate X-ray objects via GAN, and classify with CNN
Object Classification
Yang et al. [44] Baggage Image Generation Generate X-ray objects via GAN, and classify with CNN
Object Classification
Miao et al. [43] Baggage Object Classification with class-balanced hierarchical refinement
Morris et al. [134] Baggage Object Classification Region-based detection with Z-effective
Akçay and Breckon [108] Baggage Object Detection Object Detection, Faster-RCNN is the best.
Liang et al. [45] Baggage Object Detection RFCN is the best. Multi-view outperforms single view.
Steitz et al. [46] Baggage Object Detection F-RCNN with multi view pooling is superior to single view only.
Liu et al. [47] Baggage Object Detection YOLOv2 achieves real time performance.
Xu et al. [107] Baggage Object Detection Localizes the threat material from the X-ray images via attention mechanisms
Islam et al. [148] Baggage Object Detection track passengers and their belongings in airports while passing X-ray security checkpoints
Andrews et al. [48] Cargo Anomaly Detection Fusion of the raw-input and residual error with feature encoding from the hidden layers.
Akçay et al. [49] Baggage Anomaly Detection encoder- decoder-encoder sub-networks. Minimize latent vector and image space.
Akçay et al. [50] Baggage Anomaly Detection Use of skip connections. Minimize latent vector in the discriminator network.
Griffin et al. [51] Baggage Anomaly Detection Feature Extraction with CNN, then train with Gaussian model.
Table 2.2: Overview of deep learning approaches applied within X-ray security imaging.
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2.5 Conclusion
This chapter taxonomises conventional machine and modern deep algorithms utilised
within X-ray security imaging — the taxonomy sub-categorises image analysis and
machine learning approach into the traditional algorithms. Subsequently, a thorough
investigation of advanced algorithms reviews the current deep learning techniques
within the classification, detection, anomaly detection and segmentation tasks. The
discussion finally outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the existing techniques
and envision future challenges and directions of the field.
Motivated by the promising performance of the modern deep learning approaches,
the next chapter evaluates their use within the classification and detection tasks.
The evaluation provides a thorough comparison against the conventional machine
learning algorithms that achieved state-of-the-art results in pre-deep learning era
(Chapter 2). Furthermore, we consider the use of deep learning approaches be-
yond this initial remit of classification and detection into the related challenge of
generalised anomaly detection (Chapters 4 and 5).
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CHAPTER 3
On Using Deep Convolutional Neural Network Architectures




This chapter explores the use of deep Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) with
transfer learning for the image classification and detection problems posed within the
context of X-ray baggage security imagery. The use of the CNN approach requires
large amounts of data to facilitate a complicated end-to-end feature extraction and
classification process, where the model predicts the corresponding class label for the
given input. Within the context of X-ray security screening, limited availability of
object of interest data examples can thus pose a problem. To overcome this issue,
this chapter employs a transfer learning paradigm such that a pre-trained CNN,
primarily trained for generalised image classification tasks where sufficient training
data exists, can be optimised explicitly as a later secondary process towards this
application domain. In addition to the classification task, the chapter also explores
the applicability of multiple CNN driven detection paradigms, where the models not
only output the class label but also localise the object by predicting its bounding
box coordinates. The work presented here is one of the first exploiting CNN within
X-ray security imaging.
For the classification task, the chapter contains an extensive set of experiments
to evaluate the strength of CNN features, and traditional hand-crafted features
(SIFT, SURF, FAST, KAZE [8]) explained in Chapter 2. As with [9], we perform
layer freezing by fixing parameters from the source domain without any further
optimisation to observe how fixing the layer parameters at different points in the
network influences the overall performance of the transfer learning-based tuning
of the end-to-end CNN. Furthermore, in contrast to [9, 57] comparing end-to-end
CNN classification with traditional feature-driven pipelines, we additionally present
results whereby we extract the output of the last layer of a given CNN (fc7 of
Krizhevsky2012 [7]) as a feature map itself. We subsequently train an SVM classifier,
generally used as the final classification stage of feature-driven approaches [8,77–79,
84], to provide a consistent feature-space comparison between both learned (CNN)
and traditional feature representations.
In addition to the proposed classification scheme, we explore the task of object














Figure 3.1: Exemplar X-ray baggage imagery multiple objects from Figure 1.1, and the
detection results using ResNet-50 [1]. Values next to the object labels indicate the predicted
probability that the object belongs to the corresponding class.
from the image by predicting class label and bounding box coordinates. We therefore
investigate the use of a sliding window paradigm (akin to [84, 99]) and evaluate
contemporary approaches to learn efficient object localization via R-CNN [10], R-
FCN [11], and YOLOv2 [12] approaches. As shown in previous work [9, 57] the
challenging and cluttered nature of object detection in X-ray security imagery often
poses additional challenges for established contemporary classification and detection
approaches, such as RCNN/R-FCN [10,11].
Overall, the main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• the exhaustive evaluation of classification architectures of [1, 5, 7, 149] against
prior work in the field from [8,61,77,78,127]
• the feature-space comparison of the end-to-end CNN classification results of
[9,57] against the final stage SVM classification on the extracted CNN features,
• the comparison of the region based object detection/localization strategies
of [10,11] against the prior strategies proposed in [99,150].
Contrasting performance results are obtained against the prior published studies
of [8, 9] over a comprehensive dataset of 11, 627 examples making this one of the
largest combined X-ray object detection and classification study in the literature
at the time of publication. Moreover, the evaluation is strengthened further by
using UK government evaluation dataset [15]. Overall, we identify classification






conv1-2 conv2-2 conv3-3 conv4-3 conv5-3
Figure 3.2: Gradient-based class activation map (Grad-CAM [4]) of VGG16 [5] trained on
X-ray data. The first column of each convolution box demonstrates grayscale Grad-CAM,
while the second column is Grad-CAM heatmap on an input image.
and establish the use of CNN architectures for detection and classification in x-ray
security imagery via the paradigm of transfer learning.
3.2 Classification
Automated threat screening task in X-ray baggage imagery can be considered as a
classical image classification problem. Here we address this task using convolutional
neural networks and transfer learning approaches based on the prior work of [1,5,7,
56,151,152], and expanding the earlier preliminary studies of [9,57]. To these ends,
we initially outline a brief generalized background for convolutional neural networks
and transfer learning, and explain our approach to applying these techniques to
object classification within X-ray baggage security imagery.
3.2.1 Transfer Learning
Modern CNN architectures such as [1, 5, 7, 152] are trained on huge datasets such
as ImageNet [55] which contains approximately a million of data samples and 1000
distinct class labels. However, the limited applicability of such training and param-
eter optimization techniques to problems where such large datasets are not available
gives rise to the concept of transfer learning [151]. The work of [56] illustrated that
each hidden layer in a CNN has distinct feature representation related characteristics
among of which the lower layers provide general feature extraction capabilities (akin





























Fine tuning & Classification
Transfer Learned Optimized Network Parameters
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Figure 3.3: Transfer learning pipeline. (A) shows classification pipeline for a source task,
while (B) is a target task, initialized by the parameters learned in the source task.
more specific to the original classification task.
Figure 3.2, for instance, demonstrates Gradient-based class activation map (Grad-
CAM [4]) of VGG16 [5] for an example X-ray classification object. Lower layers - i.e.
conv1−2 and conv2−2, behave as edge detectors, while higher layers like conv4−3 and
conv5−3 provides more specific representations belonging to the input image. This
finding facilitates the verbatim re-use of the generalized feature extraction and rep-
resentation of the lower layers in a CNN, while higher layers are fine-tuned towards
secondary problem domains with related characteristics to the original.
Using this paradigm, as demonstrated in Figure 3.3, we can leverage the a priori
CNN parametrization of an existing fully trained network on a generic 1000+ object
class problem [55] (Figure 3.3A), as a starting point for optimization towards to
the specific problem domain of limited object class detection within X-ray images
(Figure 3.3B). Instead of designing a new CNN with random weight initialization, we
instead adopt a pre-trained CNN, pre-optimized for generalized object recognition,
and fine-tune its weights towards our specific classification domain
3.2.2 Classification within X-ray Security Imagery
To investigate the applicability of convolutional neural networks in object classifica-
tion in X-ray baggage imagery, we address two specific target problems:- a) binary
classification problem that performs firearm detection (i.e., gun vs no-gun) akin to
that of the prior work of [8] to compare CNN features to conventional handcrafted
attributes; b) a multi-class X-ray object classification problem (6 classes: firearm,
firearm-components, knives, ceramic knives, camera and laptop), which further in-
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vestigates the performance of CNN for the classification of multiple X-ray objects.
The following subsection describes the datasets we use in our experiments.
Datasets
To perform classification tasks, we use four types of datasets described below:
• Dbp2: Our dataset (11, 627 X-ray images) are constructed using single con-
ventional X-ray imagery with associated false-colour materials mapping from
dual-energy [17]. To generate a dataset for firearm detection, we manually crop
baggage objects, and label each accordingly (e.g., Figure 3.4 ) - on the assump-
tion, an in-service detection solution would perform scanning window search
through the whole baggage X-ray image. In addition to manual cropping,
we also generate a set of negative images by randomly selecting 256 × 256
fixed-sized overlapping image patches from a large corpus of baggage X-ray
images that do not contain any target objects. Following these approaches,
our evaluation datasets consist of 19, 398 X-ray sample patches for a classical
two-class firearms detection problem (positive class: 3, 179 firearm images /
1, 176 images of firearm components; negative class: 476 images of cameras,
2, 750 knives, 1, 561 ceramic knives, 995 laptops and 9, 261 cropped images of
background clutter)
• Dbp6: For the multiple class problem, we separate firearms and firearm sub-
components into two distinct classes to make the problem even more challeng-
ing. Likewise, regular and ceramic knives are considered as two different class
objects, which overall we have a 6-class problem for the multi-class task (i.e.,
each patch being either one of the six object labels).
In addition to these datasets, we also use the UK government evaluation
dataset [15], which is available upon request from the UK Home Office Centre
for Applied Science and Technology (CAST). This dataset comprises of both
expertly concealed firearm (threat) items and operational benign (non-threat)








Figure 3.4: Exemplar X-ray baggage image with extracted data set regions including back-
ground samples. Type of baggage objects in the dataset is as follows: (A) Firearm Com-
ponent, (B) Ceramic Knife, (C) Laptop, (D) Camera , (E) Firearm , (F) Knife
(baggage/parcels). From this dataset, we define two evaluation problems based
on the provided annotation for the presence of firearms threat items.
• Full Firearm vs Operational Benign - (FFOB): comprising 4, 680 firearm threat
and 5,000 non-threat images, and is denoted as FFOB.
• Firearm Parts vs Operational Benign - (FPOB): contains 8, 770 firearm and
parts threat and 5, 000 non-threat images (denoted FPOB, comprising of an-
notations as any of {bolt carrier assembly, Pump action, Set, Shotgun, Sub-
Machine-Gun}).
We split the datasets into training (60%), validation (20%) and test sets (20%)
such that each split has similar class distribution, but unseen test set contains some-
what challenging samples never trained before. We also perform random flipping,
random cropping, and rotation to each sample to augment the datasets. Moreover,
when computing the loss, we weight the data such that the classes with fewer sam-
ples have more weight. This weighting approach eliminates the classification bias
stemming from the class imbalance.
Classification
Using transfer learning paradigm explained in Section 3.2.1, this work leverages the











BPerplexity: 30 Learning Rate: 135 Iterations: 10000 Perplexity: 40 Learning Rate: 195 Iterations: 10000
Figure 3.5: t-SNE [6] visualization of feature maps extracted from the last fc layer of
VGG16 [5] fine-tuned for binary (A) and multi-class (B) problems.
1000 object class problem [55], as a starting point for optimization towards another
problem domain of limited object class detection within X-ray images.
For the binary classification problem, we specifically make use of the CNN con-
figuration designed by Krizhevsky et al. [7], having 5 convolutional layers (conv),
3 fully-connected layers (fc), and trained on the ImageNet dataset on a 1000 class
image classification problem, denoted as AlexNet [7].
The first step is to fine-tune all of the conv and fc layers of the network via
transfer learning on the training set of the target classification problem. In addition
to this, we also perform layer freezing, meaning that instead of updating layer pa-
rameters for our task, we use the original unmodified weights from the initial trained
CNN parametrization of [7]. This allows us to observe how fine-tuning each layer
impacts the overall performance.
Also, having fine-tuned the parameters via this transfer learning approach, we
extract the features of the last fully connected layer (fc7) to train on an SVM classi-
fier. This allows us to additionally compare the internal feature space representation
of the CNN model to alternative more traditional (handcrafted) BoVW features as
used in prior work [8].
Evaluation of our proposed approach is performed against the prior SVM-driven
work of Kundegorski et. al. [8] within a BoVW framework. SVM are trained using
Radial Basis Function (RBF) kernel {SVMRBF} with a grid search over kernel pa-
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rameter, γ = 2x : x ∈ {−15, 3}, and model fitting cost, c = 2x : x ∈ {5, 15}, using
k-fold cross validation (k = 5) with F-score optimization (being more representa-
tive then accuracy for unbalanced datasets). The results for the best performing
parameter set are reported for each feature configuration.
The second set of experiments is the classification of multiple baggage objects,
a more complex six class object problem. Here the lesser performing SVM with
handcrafted features are not considered (Table 3.1), in favour of the CNN approach.
Instead, we fine-tune AlexNet [7], VGG [5] and ResNet [1], each of which are top-
performing entries of ImageNet [55] object recognition competition.. By doing so,
we aim to evaluate the feasibility of CNN for this problem domain further.
To update the parameters of all the networks during training, we use cross-
entropy for the loss function and utilize Adam [4] optimizer with a learning rate of
10−3, and a weight decay of 0.005. Our stopping criterion is to terminate optimiza-
tion where validation starts to reduce, while training accuracy continues to improve.
This fork between training and validation performance usually takes 30 epochs for
this task.
3.2.3 Evaluation
The performance is evaluated by the comparison of True Positive Rate (TP) (%),
False Positive Rate (FP) (%) together with Precision (P), Accuracy (A) and F-score
(F) (harmonic mean of precision and true positive rate).
Results for the two class problem is given in Table 3.1, which is divided into
four sections: - first section lists the performance of the CNN approach, notated as
AlexNetab , meaning that the network is fine-tuned from layer a to layer b, while the
rest of the layers are frozen (Table 3.1, top). This means, for instance, AlexNet4−8
is trained by fine-tuning the layers {4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and freezing the layers {1, 2, 3} (i.e.
remain unchanged from the pre-trained model of [7]). The second section has the
results of an SVM classifier trained on the output of the last layer of CNN (Table
3.1, middle upper). Similar to the first section, we again perform layer freezing here
for a consistent comparison of CNN features and BoVW features. The third section








0: Camera 1: Ceramic Knife 2: Gun 3: Gun Component 4: Knife 5: Laptop
0.98 0.01 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.88 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.02
0.0 0.0 0.98 0.02 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.01 0.24 0.74 0.01 0.0
0.0 0.1 0.02 0.02 0.86 0.01
0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.99
0.99 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.01
0.01 0.94 0.0 0.02 0.03 0.01
0.0 0.0 0.98 0.01 0.0 0.0
0.01 0.02 0.09 0.86 0.01 0.0
0.0 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.9 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.99
1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.98 0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0
0.0 0.0 0.99 0.01 0.0 0.0
0.01 0.01 0.1 0.88 0.0 0.0
0.0 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.84 0.01
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0



























Figure 3.6: Confusion matrices for AlexNet [7], VGG16 [5] ResNet-50 [1] fine tuned for
multi class problem
(VGGM [149], VGG16 [5], ResNet18 [1], ResNet50 [1], ResNet101 [1], Table 3.1, middle
lower). The last section lists the best performing BoVW feature detector/descriptor
variants trained with SVM in the work of [8] (Table 3.1, bottom).
Table 3.1 shows the performance results of firearm detection. We see that true
and false positives have a general trend to decrease as the number of fine-tuned
layers reduces. Likewise, freezing lower layers reduces the accuracy of the models.
Training an SVM classifier on CNN features with layer freezing yields relatively
better performance than the standard end to end CNN results. We see a perfor-
mance pattern such that fine-tuning more layers has a positive impact on the overall
performance. For instance, SVM trained on fully fine-tuned CNN has the highest
performance on all of the metrics, outperforming the prior work of [8] and [9] (Table
3.1).
For an end to end fine-tuning using contemporary architectures, we observe the
direct proportion of performance and network complexity. ResNet101 [1], for in-
stance, is the best performing network among all of the end to end CNN networks
(Table3.1).
It is also significant to note that the performance of the best feature detec-
tor/descriptor combination of BoVW approach (FAST/SURF [8]) is worse than any
of the CNN features given in Table 3.1. Further comparison of BoVW+SVM against
CNN+SVM proves the superiority of CNN features to traditional handcrafted fea-
tures (Table 3.1).
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AlexNet1-8 99.26 4.08 0.741 0.961 0.849
AlexNet2-8 98.53 2.40 0.832 0.983 0.902
AlexNet3-8 96.32 2.19 0.844 0.980 0.900
AlexNet4-8 95.59 2.96 0.790 0.973 0.865
AlexNet5-8 98.16 4.68 0.711 0.961 0.825
AlexNet6-8 96.32 5.15 0.693 0.954 0.806
AlexNet7-8 94.49 3.65 0.754 0.961 0.839















AlexNet1-8 99.56 1.07 0.997 0.994 0.996
AlexNet2-8 99.30 1.50 0.996 0.991 0.994
AlexNet3-8 99.18 1.93 0.995 0.989 0.993
AlexNet4-8 98.92 1.86 0.995 0.988 0.992
AlexNet5-8 98.80 2.07 0.994 0.986 0.991
AlexNet6-8 98.68 3.00 0.991 0.983 0.983
AlexNet7-8 98.64 4.15 0.989 0.980 0.980









VGGM [149] 98.38 0.36 0.998 0.987 0.980
VGG16 [5] 99.08 1.14 0.997 0.990 0.985
ResNet18 [1] 99.38 1.43 0.996 0.992 0.988
ResNet50 [1] 99.54 1.00 0.998 0.995 0.992








SURF/SURF 79.2 3.2 0.88 0.93 0.83
KAZE/KAZE 77.3 3.9 0.85 0.92 0.81
FAST/SURF 83.0 3.3 0.88 0.94 0.85
FAST/SIFT 80.9 4.3 0.85 0.92 0.83
SIFT/SIFT 68.3 4.2 0.83 0.90 0.75
Table 3.1: Results of CNN and BoVW on Dbp2 dataset for firearm detection. AlexNetab
denotes that the network is fine tuned from layer a to layer b.
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P R A F
AlexNet1-8 0.911 0.904 0.904 0.906
AlexNet2-8 0.842 0.841 0.833 0.835
AlexNet3-8 0.843 0.841 0.844 0.841
AlexNet4-8 0.841 0.853 0.844 0.846
AlexNet5-8 0.833 0.821 0.823 0.811
AlexNet6-8 0.820 0.810 0.819 0.809
AlexNet7-8 0.774 0.793 0.722 0.761
AlexNet8 0.721 0.742 0.701 0.712
VGGM [149] 0.928 0.932 0.923 0.926
VGG16 [5] 0.931 0.943 0.940 0.936
ResNet18 [1] 0.933 0.943 0.936 0.937
ResNet50 [1] 0.934 0.910 0.923 0.917
ResNet101 [1] 0.936 0.946 0.937 0.938
Table 3.2: Statistical evaluation of CNN architectures (AlexNet, VGG, and ResNet) on
Dbp6 dataset for multi-class problem.
Table 3.2 shows the overall performance of the networks fine-tuned for multiple
class problem. Like Table 3.1, fine-tuning the entire network yields the best perfor-
mance. A conclusion can be reached from these results that fine-tuning higher-level
layers and freezing lower ones have a detrimental impact on the performance of the
CNN model. Similar to Table 3.1, performance and network complexity are also di-
rectly proportional. With relatively lower complexity than the rest, AlexNet [7] has
the lowest accuracy of 92.4. ResNet101 [1], on the other hand, achieves the highest
on all metrics (P=93.6% R=94.6% A=93.7% F=93.8%).
In addition, results are presented on the UK government evaluation dataset [15]
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 . Within Table 3.3 and 3.4 we present results for classifica-
tion only (following the approach of Section 3.2.1), where we can see comparable
performance to the earlier results presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2.
Figure 5.8 depicts the t-SNE [6] visualization of feature maps of the down-
projected internal feature space representation extracted from VGG16 [5] fine-tuned
for binary (A) and multi-class (B) problems. In both cases, classes are well sepa-
rated, showing the capability of CNN features within this problem domain (Figure
5.8 Figure 3.6 depicts per-class accuracy obtained via the use of AlexNet [7] and
ResNet101 [1], the worst and best performing networks within this task. We see
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TP% FP% P A F
AlexNet [7] 99.830 0.943 0.990 0.994 0.994
VGGM [5] 99.010 0.000 1.000 0.995 0.995
VGG16 [5] 99.831 0.000 1.000 0.999 0.999
ResNet18 [1] 99.472 0.000 1.000 0.997 0.997
ResNet50 [1] 100.00 0.923 0.990 0.995 0.995
ResNet101 [1] 100.00 0.311 0.996 0.998 0.998
Table 3.3: Statistical evaluation of varying CNN architectures (AlexNet, VGG, and
ResNet) on FFOB dataset [15].
TP% FP% P A F
AlexNet [7] 95.088 3.527 0.960 0.958 0.958
VGGM [5] 95.864 0.919 0.990 0.974 0.974
VGG16 [5] 97.238 4.217 0.954 0.965 0.964
ResNet18 [1] 95.725 0.744 0.992 0.975 0.974
ResNet50 [1] 99.411 1.060 0.988 0.991 0.991
ResNet101 [1] 99.608 0.000 1.000 0.998 0.998
Table 3.4: Statistical evaluation of varying CNN architectures (AlexNet, VGG, and
ResNet) on FPOB dataset [15].
that laptop and camera object classes are straightforward to classify. In contrast,
networks have relatively lower classification confidence for the knife, ceramic knife
vs firearm, firearm parts, which obviously stems from the similarity of the objects.
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laptop 1.000 camera 1.000 laptop 1.000 knife 0.932
gun 0.998 gun_component 0.564 gun 0.999 gun 0.998
gun_comp 0.993 ceramic_knife 0.996 knife 0.998 gun 1.000
knife 0.816 laptop 1.000 ceramic_knife 0.850 gun 0.951
gun_comp 0.923 gun 0.991 gun 0.998 ceramic_knife 0.965
Figure 3.7: Exemplar image cases where a ResNet-50 [1] successfully classifies an object
in the presence of clutter and other confusing items of interest (here: background laptop
detected, knives/guns missed).
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laptop 0.999 laptop 1.000 knife 0.816 knife 0.594
gun_comp 0.777 ceramic_knife 0.542 laptop 1.000 gun_comp 0.951
knife 0.636 knife 0.957 gun 0.992 laptop 1.000
gun 0.668 knife 0.523 gun 0.997 gun_comp 0.995
gun_comp 0.954 laptop 0.976 knife 0.997 knife 0.967
Figure 3.8: Exemplar image cases where a ResNet-50 [1] successfully classifies an object in
the presence of clutter and other confusing items of interest.
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gun 0.906 ceramic_knife 0.988 ceramic_knife 0.965 gun 0.999
gun 0.989 gun 0.999 gun 0.996 laptop 1.000
knife 0.999 gun 0.999 gun 0.982 knife 0.987
gun_comp 0.619 ceramic_knife 0.994 knife 0.974 laptop 1.000
gun 0.993 camera 0.987 gun 0.996 knife 0.854
Figure 3.9: Exemplar image cases where a ResNet-50 [1] successfully classifies an object in
the presence of clutter and other confusing items of interest.
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gun_comp 0.470 ceramic_knife 0.584 gun_comp 0.499 knife 0.587
gun 0.645 knife 0.717 gun 0.559 gun 0.717
knife 0.698 knife 0.585 knife 0.593 camera 0.960
gun 0.953 knife 0.483 knife 0.554 ceramic_knife 0.578
knife 0.872 ceramic_knife 0.588 knife 0.542 gun 0.417
Figure 3.10: Exemplar image cases where a ResNet-50 [1] fails to detect an object in the
presence of clutter and other confusing items of interest.
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ceramic_knife 0.739 gun 0.966 ceramic_knife 0.611 gun_comp 0.570
gun 0.719 ceramic_knife 0.828 ceramic_knife 0.750 gun 0.507
ceramic_knife 0.503 ceramic_knife 0.598 camera 0.711 gun 0.823
knife 0.724 knife 0.918 gun 0.513 knife 0.604
ceramic_knife 0.682 gun 0.484 gun 0.634 gun_comp 0.987
Figure 3.11: Exemplar image cases where a ResNet-50 [1] fails to detect an object in the
presence of clutter and other confusing items of interest.
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knife 0.708 knife 0.977 knife 0.604 gun 0.417
gun_comp 0.543 ceramic_knife 0.671 gun_comp 0.594 ceramic_knife 0.858
gun 0.808 gun 0.935 ceramic_knife 0.508 gun 0.966
camera 0.711 ceramic_knife 0.578 gun 0.686 gun 0.937
gun 0.616 gun 0.508 ceramic_knife 0.519 knife 0.677
Figure 3.12: Exemplar image cases where a ResNet-50 [1] fails to detect an object in the
presence of clutter and other confusing items of interest.
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Limitations: Due to the cluttered nature of the input dataset, there are certain cases
where CNN based classification fails to classify threats. Figure 3.10, for instance,
demonstrates that CNN labels these image examples as laptops with high confidence,
as the predominant object signature present in the image patch, while failing to
detect the foreground objects of interest. This results in a significant increase in
false-negative occurrences (Table 3.2). We consider this primarily as an object
detection problem, and hence explore the contemporary object detection strategies
in the subsequent part of this study.
3.3 Object Detection
We see from Section 3.2 that CNN-based classification approaches via transfer learn-
ing yield promising performance, especially for single and non-occluded X-ray image
patches. When it comes to classifying multiple objects (Figures 3.10, 3.11, 3.12),
however, more sophisticated approaches are needed to perform joint localization.
Here we give a brief introduction to CNN based object detection algorithms for an
exhaustive evaluation within X-ray baggage domain.
3.3.1 Detection Strategies
Within this work, we consider a number of competing for contemporary detection
frameworks and explore their applicability and performance for generalised object
detection in X-ray baggage imagery.
3.3.2 Detection within X-ray Security Imagery
We compare four localization strategies for our object detection task within X-ray
security imagery: a traditional sliding window approach [99] coupled with CNN
classification [150], Faster RCNN (F-RCNN) [10], R-FCN [11], and YOLOv2 [12],
each of which is thoroughly explained in Appendix A.3.2.
Dataset: Instead of using the X-ray patches that we manually crop for the classi-
fication task in Section 3.2, here we use full X-ray images to perform binary and
multiple class object detection.
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Figure 3.13: Schematics for the CNN driven detection strategies evaluated. A. Sliding
Window based CNN (SW-CNN) [8, 9], B. Faster RCNN (F-RCNN) [10], C. R-FCN [11],
D. YOLOv2 [12]).
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Detection: For sliding window CNN (SW-CNN) we employ 800× 800 input image,
256× 256 fixed-size window with a step size of 32 to generate region proposals. We
also use image pyramids to fit the window to varying sized objects using 9 pyramid
levels. For the classification of the proposed regions we use AlexNet [7], VGGM, 16 [5],
and ResNet-{50, 101} [1] networks. Although [150] employs an extra bounding box
regression layer within their SW-CNN approach, we do not perform regression as
none of the prior work within this domain does so [84,99].
For Faster RCNN [10] we use the original implementation with a few modifi-
cations, and train Faster RCNN with AlexNet [7], VGGM, 16 [5], and ResNet-{50,
101} [1] architectures. Since R-FCN is fully convolutional by design, we only use
ResNet-{50, 101} [1] networks for R-FCN to train and test. Pipeline and implemen-
tational details of these approaches are thoroughly explained in Appendix A.3.2
For the training of the detection strategies explained here, we employ a transfer
learning approach and use the networks pre-trained on ImageNet dataset [55]. In
so doing not only increases performance but also reduces training time significantly.
We use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) with momentum and weight decay of 0.9
and 0.0005, respectively. The initial learning rate of 0.001 is divided by 10 with step
down method in every 10, 000 iteration. For F-RCNN/R-FCN, the batch size is set
to 256 for the RPN. All of the networks are trained by using dual-core Intel Xeon
E5-2630 v4 processor and Nvidia GeForce GTX Titan X GPU.
3.3.3 Evaluation
Performance of the models is evaluated by mean average precision (mAP), used for
PASCAL VOC object detection challenge [153]. To calculate mAP, we perform the
following: we first sort nd detections based on their confidence scores. Next, we
calculate the area of intersection over union for the given ground truth and detected
bounding boxes for each detection as





where Bgti and Bdti are ground truth and detected bounding boxes for detection i,
respectively. Assuming each detection as unique, and denoting the area as ai, we
then threshold it by θ = 0.5 giving a logical bi, where
bi =
1 ai > θ;0 otherwise. (3.2)
This is followed by a prefix-sum giving both true positives ~t and false positives ~f ,
where
ti = ti−1 + bi, (3.3)
fi = ti−1 + (1− bi).









where np is the number of positive samples. For a smoother curve, precision vector
is then interpolated by using
pi = max(pi, pi+1). (3.5)















Model Network mAP camera laptop gun gun component knife ceramic knife
SWCNN AlexNet 0.608 0.682 0.609 0.748 0.714 0.212 0.683
VGGM 0.634 0.707 0.637 0.763 0.731 0.246 0.719
VGG16 0.649 0.701 0.724 0.752 0.757 0.223 0.734
ResNet50 0.671 0.692 0.801 0.747 0.761 0.314 0.713
ResNet101 0.776 0.881 0.902 0.831 0.848 0.392 0.803
RCNN AlexNet 0.647 0.791 0.815 0.853 0.582 0.188 0.658
VGGM 0.686 0.799 0.855 0.869 0.658 0.210 0.723
VGG16 0.779 0.888 0.954 0.876 0.832 0.304 0.819
F-RCNN AlexNet 0.788 0.893 0.756 0.914 0.874 0.467 0.823
VGGM 0.823 0.900 0.834 0.918 0.875 0.542 0.869
VGG16 0.883 0.881 0.918 0.927 0.938 0.721 0.912
ResNet50 0.851 0.844 0.879 0.916 0.901 0.677 0.889
ResNet101 0.874 0.857 0.904 0.931 0.911 0.732 0.907
R-FCN ResNet50 0.846 0.894 0.928 0.932 0.918 0.506 0.896
ResNet101 0.856 0.887 0.906 0.942 0.925 0.556 0.920
YOLOv2 Darknet288 0.810 0.821 0.861 0.914 0.904 0.551 0.814
Darknet416 0.851 0.888 0.883 0.952 0.924 0.605 0.851
Darknet544 0.885 0.896 0.894 0.943 0.933 0.728 0.913
Table 3.5: Detection results of SW-CNN, Fast-RCNN (F-RCNN) [16], Faster RCNN (F-RCNN) [10], R-FCN [11] and YOLOv2 [12] for multi-
class problem (300 region proposals). Class names indicates corresponding average precision (AP) of each class, and mAP indicates mean
average precision of the classes.
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Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show binary and multi-class detection results for SW-CNN,
F-RCNN, R-FCN with varying networks, and a fixed sized number of region pro-
posals of 300, and for YOLOv2 with a fixed network with varying input image
size. For completeness, we additionally present the comparative results for Fast
R-CNN (RCNN) [16] (detection architecture pre-dating that of F-RCNN [10] and
R-FCN [10]).
As a general trend, we observe that performance increases with overall network
complexity such that superior performance is obtained with VGG16 and ResNet101
for the region-based approaches. This observation holds for both the 2-class and
6-class problems considered here. Overall, YOLOv2 yields the leading performance
for both 2-class and 6-class problems. In addition to this set of experiments, we
also train the detection approaches using the pre-trained weights of Dbp6 dataset
introduced in Section 3.2.2. Since not observing significant nuances in results, we
do not include them here.
For the multi-class detection task (Table 3.5) we see a similar performance pat-
tern to that seen in the earlier firearm detection task. Here, SW-CNN performs
worse than any network trained using a Faster RCNN or R-FCN architecture. Sim-
ilirwise, overall mAP of RCNN is lower than any R-FCN and R-FCN architecture.
For comparison of F-RCNN and R-FCN, we observe that Faster RCNN achieves
its highest peak using VGG16, with higher mAP than ResNet-50 and ResNet101.
R-FCN with ResNet-50 and ResNet101 yields slightly worse performance, (mAP:
0.846, 0.856) , than that of the best of Faster-RCNN. For the overall performance
comparison, YOLOv2 with an input size of 544×544 shows superior performance
(mAP: 0.885).
For firearm detection Table 3.6 shows that SW-CNN, even with a complex second
stage classification CNN such as VGG16 and ResNet101, performs poorly compared
to any other detection approaches. This poor performance is primarily due to lacking
a bounding box regression layer (Figure 5.3), a significant performance booster, as
shown in [150, 154]. Likewise, the best performance of RCNN with VGG16 (mAP:
0.854) is worse than any F-RCNN or R-FCN. This is because the RPN within
F-RCNN and R-FCN provides superior object proposals than the selective-search
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approach used in RCNN. For overall performance on the binary firearm detection
task, R-FCN with YOLOv2 with an input image of size 416×416 yields the highest
mAP of 0.974.



















Table 3.6: Detection results of SW-CNN, Fast-RCNN (RCNN) [16], Faster RCNN (F-
RCNN) [10], R-FCN [11] and YOLOv2 [12] for firearm detection problem (300 region
proposals).
Figure 3.14 illustrates the impact on the number of region proposals and input
image sizes on both detection performance and runtime. Figure 3.14A-B demon-
strate detection performance of the approaches on 2-class and 6-class detection tasks,
respectively. Increase in the number of region proposals and input image size lead
to a rise in detection performance. Overall, YOLOv2 achieves the highest detection
on both tasks. Figure 3.14C shows mean runtime in frame per second (fps) where
we can see YOLOv2 significantly outperforms the rest of the detection approaches.
The lowest fps YOLOv2 achieves (50fps) is still considerably better than the best
runtime R-FCN (20), F-RCNN (2.9) and SW-CNN (0.8) achieve.
Figures 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 illustrate qualitative examples extracted from the
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statistical performance analysis of Table 3.5. We see that detection approaches
can cope with cluttered datasets where classification methods can fail as shown in
Figures 3.10, 3.11, 3.12.
There are cases where the detection strategies fail to localise certain objects of
interests. In Figure 3.18, we see that SW-CNN almost always fails to detect occluded
objects such as guns and knives on a laptop. F-RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2 achieve
relatively superior performance than SW-CNN.
Figure 3.19 demonstrate samples whose difficulty is graded as moderate. Similar
to that of Figure 3.18, SW-CNN cannot detect occluded objects. R-FCN also strug-
gles to detect occluded items. F-RCNN performs slightly better than SW-CNN and
R-FCN such that it is capable of detecting 4 out 5 images, missing the laptop on the
5th image. Among the detection strategies, YOLOv2 is the best performing model
for the moderate samples, detecting all objects of interests.
For the difficult examples shown in Figure 3.20, SW-CNN, again, does not per-
form well, missing all of the concealed items. F-RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2, on
the other and, perform better detection performance than SW-CNN; however, their
detection rate is yet to be promising. It is important to note here that the objects
that are missed by the strategies are rather challenging samples. These mis-detected
cases could be minimised by exploiting the multiple views such that the networks
could increase their detection confidence with the views showing the occluded object
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SW-CNN, F-RCNN, R-FCN YOLOv2























Figure 3.14: Impact of number of box proposals on performance. (A) for binary class (B)
for multi-class (C) Runtime. Models are trained using ResNet101
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SW-CNN F-RCNN R-FCN YOLOv2
camera 0.983
gun comp. 0.986gun comp. 0.888
camera 0.990camera 0.960camera 0.971
gun comp. 0.989gun comp. 0.975
ceramic knife 0.912ceramic knife 1.000ceramic knife 0.879ceramic knife 0.964
gun 0.899gun 0.993gun 0.999gun 0.911
camera 0.811camera 0.799camera 0.756camera 0.845
gun comp. 0.999gun comp. 0.993gun comp. 0.987gun comp. 0.914
laptop 0.852laptop 0.864laptop 0.886laptop 0.978
camera 0.911 camera 0.883 camera 0.754 camera 0.799
Figure 3.15: Easy examples detected by all of the detection approaches trained using
ResNet101. Columns: SW-CNN, Faster RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2.
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camera 0.856camera 0.874camera 0.754
laptop 1.000laptop 0.987laptop 0.999laptop 0.999
laptop 0.933 laptop 0.922 laptop 0.974 laptop 0.945
camera 0.999camera 0.877camera 0.745camera 0.897
laptop 0.996laptop 0.999laptop 0.981laptop 0.989
gun 0.900 gun 0.888 gun 0.871
laptop 1.000laptop 0.997laptop 0.999
gun comp. 0.861gun comp. 0.765gun comp. 0.754gun comp. 0.711
laptop 0.777laptop 0.789laptop 0.864laptop 0.877
Figure 3.16: Moderate examples detected by all of the detection approaches trained using
ResNet101. Columns: SW-CNN, Faster RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2.
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SW-CNN F-RCNN R-FCN YOLOv2
laptop 1.000laptop 0.996laptop 1.000laptop 0.998
laptop 0.911laptop 0.944laptop 0.911laptop 0.788
camera 0.977camera 0.944camera 0.896camera 0.911
laptop 0.930laptop 0.998laptop 0.999laptop 0.996
laptop 0.964laptop 0.901laptop 0.900laptop 0.987
laptop 0.899laptop 0.911laptop 0.962laptop 0.978
camera 0.877camera 0.799camera 0.800camera 0.884
camera 0.911camera 0.999camera 0.983camera 0.933
knife 0.765knife 0.899knife 0.788knife 0.879
laptop 0.981 laptop 0.977 laptop 0.933 laptop 0.899
gun comp. 0.945gun comp. 0.956gun comp. 0.912gun comp. 0.944
gun 0.966gun 0.756gun 0.941gun 0.987
gun 0.981gun 0.980
gun 0.964gun 0.799
Figure 3.17: Difficult examples detected by all of the detection approaches trained using
ResNet101. Columns: SW-CNN, Faster RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2.
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SW-CNN F-RCNN R-FCN YOLOv2
camera 0.901camera 0.879camera 0.745camera 0.879
gun 0.901gun 0.912gun 0.888gun 0.874
laptop 0.932laptop 0.964laptop 0.987laptop 0.912
ceramic knife 0.756ceramic knife 0.831ceramic knife 0.786
laptop 0.996 laptop 0.865 laptop 0.975 laptop 0.999
gun 0.936gun 0.923
gun comp. 0.987 gun comp. 0.983 gun comp. 0.944 gun comp. 0.954
laptop 0.983 laptop 0.991 laptop 0.999 laptop 1.000
ceramic knife 0.867ceramic knife 0.831
Figure 3.18: Easy examples (mis)detected by some of the detection approaches trained
using ResNet101. Columns: SW-CNN, Faster RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2.
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SW-CNN F-RCNN R-FCN YOLOv2
laptop 0.888 laptop 0.932
laptop 0.911
laptop 0.900
laptop 1.000laptop 0.723laptop 0.888laptop 0.944
laptop 0.911 laptop 0.964 laptop 0.910 laptop 0.856
laptop 0.999 laptop 0.987 laptop 0.999 laptop 1.000
laptop 0.861laptop 0.777
ceramic knife 0.930ceramic knife 0.711ceramic knife 0.765
gun 0.942gun 1.000
gun comp. 0.888gun comp. 0.812
gun 0.811 gun 0.732
Figure 3.19: Moderate examples (mis)detected by some of the detection approaches trained
using ResNet101. Columns: SW-CNN, Faster RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2.
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ceramic knife 0.901ceramic knife 0.777
laptop 0.931laptop 0.900 laptop 0.876 laptop 0.981
ceramic knife 0.710
laptop 0.897 laptop 0.911 laptop 0.879 laptop 0.891
gun 0.744gun 0.763
gun comp. 0.756
gun comp. 0.711 gun comp. 0.800
Figure 3.20: Difficult examples (mis)detected by some of the detection approaches trained
using ResNet101. Columns: SW-CNN, Faster RCNN, R-FCN and YOLOv2.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter exhaustively explores the use of CNN in the tasks of classification and
detection within X-ray baggage imagery. For the classification problem, we make a
comparison between CNN and traditional BoVW approaches based on handcrafted
features. To do so, we perform layer freezing to observe the relative performance
of fixed and fine-tuned sets of CNN feature maps. In addition to this, we train an
SVM classifier on top of the last layer of the network to have a consistent comparison
between CNN and handcrafted features. We also explore various CNN to see the
impact of network complexity on overall performance.
Experimentation demonstrates that CNN features achieve superior performance
to handcrafted BoVW features. Fine-tuning the entire network for this problem
yields 99.6% True Positive (TP), 0.011 False Positive (FP) and 99.4 accuracy (A), a
significant improvement on the best performing handcrafted feature detector/descriptor
(FAST/SURF, 0.830 TP, 0.033 FP, 0.940 A). For the classification of multiple X-ray
baggage objects, ResNet-50 achieves 0.986 (A), clearly demonstrating the applicabil-
ity of CNN within X-ray baggage imagery, and outperforming prior reported results
in the field [8, 77–79,84].
In addition to classification, we also study object detection strategies to improve
the performance of cluttered datasets further, where classification techniques fail.
Hence, we examine the relative performance of traditional sliding window driven
detection with CNN model [99, 150] against contemporary region-based [10, 11, 16]
and single forward-pass based [12] CNN variants. We show that contemporary Faster
RCNN, R-FCN, and YOLOv2 approaches outperform SW-CNN, which is already
empirically shown to outperform handcrafted features, regarding both speed and
accuracy.
YOLOv2 yields 0.885 and 0.974 mAP over 6-class object detection and 2-class
firearm detection problems, respectively. This result illustrates the real-time appli-
cability and superiority of such integrated region based detection models within this
X-ray security imagery context.
Despite their promising performance, classification and detection models pre-
sented in this chapter, are all supervised, requiring expensive data annotation and
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balanced datasets. Within the X-ray security screening context, however, available
datasets are highly imbalanced such that the number of benign examples is sig-
nificantly larger than threat samples. To cope with this class imbalance and data
annotation issues, the next chapter investigates the use of unsupervised techniques
to detect prohibited items within X-ray security imaging by considering them as
generalised anomalies within the normal distribution of such imagery.
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CHAPTER 4
GANomaly: Semi-Supervised Anomaly Detection via
Adversarial Training
4.1 Introduction
Despite yielding encouraging performance over various computer vision tasks, as out-
lined in Chapter 3, supervised approaches heavily depend on large, labelled datasets.
In many of the real-world problems, however, samples from the more unusual classes
of interest are of insufficient sizes to be effectively modelled. Instead, the task of
anomaly detection is to be able to identify such cases, by training only on samples
considered to be normal and then identifying these unusual, insufficiently available
samples (abnormal) that differ from the learned sample distribution of normality.
For example, a tangible application, that is considered here within our evaluation,
is that of X-ray screening for aviation or border security — where anomalous items
posing a security threat are not commonly encountered, exemplary data of such
can be difficult to obtain in any quantity, and the nature of any anomaly posing a
potential threat may evolve due to a range of external factors. However, within this
challenging context, human security operators are still competent and adaptable
anomaly detectors against new and emerging anomalous threat signatures.
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(a) Normal Data (X-ray Scans) (b) Normal + Abnormal Data (X-ray Scans)
Figure 4.1: Overview of our anomaly detection approach within the context of an X-ray
security screening problem. Our model is trained on normal samples (a), and tested on
normal and abnormal samples (b). Anomalies are detected when the output of the model
is greater than a certain threshold A(x) > φ.
In general, in many situations, the availability of abnormal data samples is lim-
ited, and the representation of any available samples is merely a subset of all poten-
tial anomalous samples of that could be encountered within the deployment. This
is a key challenge within anomaly detection.
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, a formal problem definition of the anomaly detection
task is as follows: given a dataset D containing a large number of normal samples
X for training, and relatively few abnormal examples X̂ for the test, a model f is
optimized over its parameters θ. f learns the data distribution pX of the normal
samples during training while identifying abnormal samples as outliers during testing
by outputting an anomaly scoreA(x), where x is a given test example. A largerA(x)
indicates possible abnormalities within the test image since f learns to minimize this
output score during training over the sets of normal examples. A(x) is general in
that it can detect unseen anomalies as being non-conforming to pX.
There is a large volume of studies proposing anomaly detection models within
various application domains [13, 155–158]. In addition, a considerable amount of
work taxonomizes the approaches within the literature [159–163]. In parallel to the
recent advances in this field, Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) have emerged
as a leading methodology across both unsupervised and semi-supervised problems.
Goodfellow et al. [164] first proposed this approach by co-training a pair of networks
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(generator and discriminator). The former network within this GAN formulation
models high dimensional data from a latent vector to resemble the source data, while
the latter network distinguishes the modelled (i.e., approximated) and original data
samples. Several approaches followed this work to improve the training and inference
stages [137, 165]. As reviewed in [158], adversarial training has also been adopted
by recent work within anomaly detection.
Schlegl et al. [13] hypothesize that the latent vector of a GAN represents the true
distribution of the data and remap to the latent vector by optimizing a pre-trained
GAN based on the latent vector. The limitation is the enormous computational
complexity of remapping to this latent vector space. In a follow-up study, Zenati et
al. [14] train a BiGAN model [166], which maps from image space to latent space
jointly, and report statistically and computationally superior results albeit on the
simplistic MNIST benchmark dataset [167] (i.e. a leave one class out the formulation
of handwritten digits recognition)
Motivated by [13,14,168], here we propose a generic anomaly detection architec-
ture comprising an adversarial training framework. In a similar vein to [13], we use
single-colour images as the input to our approach drawn only from an example set
of normal (non-anomalous) training examples. However, in contrast, our approach
does not require two-stage training and is both efficient for model training and later
inference (run-time testing). As with [14], we also learn image and latent vector
spaces jointly. Our key novelty comes from the fact that we employ adversarial au-
toencoder within an encoder-decoder-encoder pipeline, capturing the training data
distribution within both image and latent vector space. An adversarial training ar-
chitecture such as this, practically based on only normal training data examples,
produces superior performance over challenging benchmark problems. The main
contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• semi-supervised anomaly detection — a novel adversarial autoencoder within
an encoder-decoder-encoder pipeline, capturing the training data distribution
within both image and latent vector space, yielding superior results to con-
temporary GAN-based and traditional autoencoder-based approaches.
• efficacy — an efficient and novel approach to anomaly detection that yields
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Real / Fake
Input/Output Conv LeakyReLU BatchNorm ConvTranspose ReLU Tanh Softmax
Figure 4.2: Pipeline of the proposed approach for anomaly detection.
both statistically and computationally better performance.
In addition, the chapter proposes a simple and effective algorithm such that the
results could be reproduced via the code1 made publicly available.
4.2 Our Approach: GANomaly
We denote our approach as GANomaly - the application of the GAN concept to
anomaly detection via reconstructive error.
Problem Definition
Our objective is to train an unsupervised network that detects anomalies using a
dataset that is highly biased towards a particular class - i.e., comprising normal
non-anomalous occurrences only for training. The formal definition of this problem
is as follows:
We are given a large training dataset D comprising only M normal images,
D = {X1, . . . , XM}, and a smaller testing dataset D̂ of N normal and abnormal
images, D̂ = {(X̂1, y1), . . . , (X̂N , yN)}, where yi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the image label. In
1The code is available on https://github.com/samet-akcay/ganomaly
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the practical setting, the training set is significantly larger than the test set such
that M  N .
Given the dataset, our goal is first to model D to learn its manifold, then detect
the abnormal samples in D̂ as outliers to this manifold during the inference stage.
The model f learns both the normal data distribution and minimizes the output
anomaly scoreA(x). For a given test image x̂, a high anomaly score ofA(x̂) indicates
possible anomalies within the image. The evaluation criteria for this is to threshold
(φ) the score, where A(x̂) > φ indicates an anomaly instance.
Ganomaly Pipeline
Figure 4.2 illustrates the overview of our approach, which contains two encoders, a
decoder, and discriminator networks, employed within three sub-networks.
First sub-network is a ‘bow-tie’ autoencoder network behaving as the generator
part of the model. The generator learns the input data representation and recon-
structs the input image via the use of an encoder and a decoder network, respectively.
The formal principle of the sub-network is the following: the generator G first reads
an input x + n, where x ∈ Rw×h×c, n is a Gaussian noise with a random mean and
standard deviation, and forward-passes it to its encoder network GE. With the use
of convolutional layers followed by batch-norm and leaky ReLU() activation, respec-
tively, GE downscales x by compressing it to a vector z, where z ∈ Rd. This vector,
z, is also known as the bottleneck features of G and hypothesized to have the small-
est dimension containing the best representation of the distribution from which x is
drawn. The decoder part GD of the generator network G adopts the architecture of
a DCGAN generator [169], using convolutional transpose layers, ReLU() activation
and batch-norm together with a tanh layer at the end. This approach upscales the
vector z to reconstruct the image x as x̂. Based on these, the generator network G
generates image x̂ via x̂ = GD(z), where z = GE(x) (Figure 4.2 upper left).
The second sub-network is the encoder network E that compresses the image x̂
that is reconstructed by the network G. With different parametrization, it has the
same architectural details as GE. E downscales x̂ to find its feature representation
ẑ = E(x̂). The dimension of the vector ẑ is the same as that of z for consistent
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comparison. This sub-network is one of the unique parts of the proposed approach.
Unlike the prior autoencoder-based approaches, in which the minimization of the
latent vectors is achieved via the bottleneck features, this sub-network E explicitly
learns to minimize the distance with its parametrization. During the test time,
moreover, the anomaly detection is performed with this minimization (Figure 4.2
upper right).
The third sub-network is the discriminator network D whose objective is to
classify the input x and the output x̂ as real or fake, respectively. This sub-network
is the standard discriminator network introduced in DCGAN [169] (Figure 4.2 lower
right).
Having defined our overall multi-network architecture, as depicted in Figure 4.2,
we now move on to discuss how we formulate our objective for learning.
4.2.1 Model Training
We hypothesize that when an abnormal image is forward-passed into the network
G, GD is not able to reconstruct the abnormalities even though GE manages to
map the input x to the latent vector z. This is because the network is modelled
only on normal samples during training and its parametrization is not suitable for
generating abnormal samples. An output x̂ that has missed abnormalities can lead
to the encoder network E mapping x̂ to a vector ẑ that has also missed abnormal
feature representation, causing dissimilarity between z and ẑ. When there is such
dissimilarity within latent vector space for an input image x, the model classifies
x as an anomalous image. To validate this hypothesis, we formulate our objective
function by combining three loss functions, each of which optimizes individual sub-
networks.
Adversarial Loss
Following the current trend within the new anomaly detection approaches [13, 14],
we also use feature matching loss for adversarial learning. Proposed by Salimans
et al. [170], feature matching is shown to reduce the instability of GAN training.
Unlike the vanilla GAN where G is updated based on the output of D (real/fake),
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here we update G based on the internal representation of D. Formally, let f be
a function that outputs an intermediate layer of the discriminator D for a given
input x drawn from the input data distribution pX, feature matching computes the
L2 distance between the feature representation of the original and the generated
images, respectively. Hence, our adversarial loss of Ladv is defined as:
Ladv = Ex∼pX‖f(x)− Ex∼pXf(G(x)‖2. (4.1)
Contextual Loss
The adversarial loss Ladv is adequate to fool the discriminator D with generated
samples. However, with only an adversarial loss, the generator is not optimized
towards learning contextual information about the input data. It has been shown
that penalizing the generator by measuring the distance between the input and the
generated images remedies this issue [138]. Isola et al. [138] show that the use of
L1 yields less blurry reconstruction (x̂) results than L2. Hence, we also penalize
G by measuring the L1 distance between the original x and the generated images
(x̂ = G(x)) using a contextual loss Lcon defined as:
Lcon = Ex∼pX‖x−G(x)‖1. (4.2)
Encoder Loss
The two losses introduced above can enforce the generator to produce images that are
not only realistic but also contextually sound. Moreover, we employ an additional
encoder loss Lenc to minimize the distance between the bottleneck features of the
input (z = GE(x)) and the encoded features of the generated image (ẑ = E(G(x))).
Lenc is formally defined as:
Lenc = Ex∼pX‖GE(x)− E(G(x))‖2. (4.3)
In so doing, the generator learns how to encode features of the generated image for
normal samples. For anomalous inputs, however, it will fail to minimize the distance
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of the three models. A) AnoGAN [13], B) Efficient-GAN-Anomaly
[14], C) Our Approach: GANomaly
between the input and the generated images in the feature space since both G and
E networks are optimized towards normal samples only.
Overall, our objective function for the generator becomes the following:
L = λadvLadv + λconLcon + λencLenc (4.4)
where λadv, λcon and λenc are the weighting parameters adjusting the impact of
individual losses to the overall objective function.
4.2.2 Model Testing
During the test stage, the model uses Lenc given in Eq 4.3 for scoring the abnormality
of a given image. Hence, for a test sample x̂, our anomaly score A(x̂) or sx̂ is defined
as:
A(x̂) = ‖GE(x̂)− E(G(x̂))‖1. (4.5)
To evaluate the overall anomaly performance, we compute the anomaly score
for individual test sample x̂ within the test set D̂, which in turn yields us a set of
anomaly scores S = {si : A(x̂i), x̂i ∈ D̂}. We then apply feature scaling to have the





The use of Eq 5.6 ultimately yields an anomaly score vector S ′ for the final
evaluation of the test set D̂.
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4.3 Experimental Setup
To evaluate our anomaly detection framework, we use three types of dataset rang-
ing from the simplistic benchmark of MNIST [167], the reference benchmark of CI-




To replicate the results presented in [14], we first experiment on MNIST data [167]
by treating one class being an anomaly, while the rest of the classes are considered
as the normal class. In total, we have ten sets of data, each of which considers
individual digits as the anomaly.
CIFAR10
Within our use of the CIFAR dataset [171], we again treat one class as abnormal
and the rest as normal. We then detect the outlier anomalies as instances drawn
from the former class by training the model on the latter labels.
University Baggage Anomaly Dataset — (UBA)
This sliding window patched-based dataset comprises 230,275 image patches. Nor-
mal samples are extracted via an overlapping sliding window from a full X-ray
image, constructed using single conventional X-ray imagery with associated false-
colour materials mapping from dual-energy [18]. Abnormal classes (122, 803) are of
3 sub-classes — knife (63, 496), gun (45, 855) and gun component (13, 452) — con-
tain manually cropped threat objects together with sliding window patches whose
intersection over union with the ground truth is greater than 0.3.
Full Firearm vs. Operational Benign — (FFOB)
In addition to these datasets, we also use the UK government evaluation dataset [15],
comprising both expertly concealed firearm (threat) items and operational benign
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(non-threat) imagery from commercial X-ray security screening operations (bag-
gage/parcels). Denoted as FFOB, this dataset comprises 4, 680 firearm full-weapons
as full abnormal and 67, 672 operational benign as full normal images, respectively.
4.3.2 Implementational Details
The procedure for train and test set split for the above datasets is as follows: we
split the normal samples such that 80% and 20% of the samples are considered as
part of the train and test sets, respectively. We then resize MNIST to 32×32, DBA
and FFOB to 64× 64, respectively.
Following Schlegl et al. [13] (AnoGAN) and Zenati et al. [14] (EGBAD), our
adversarial training is also based on the standard DCGAN approach [169] for a con-
sistent comparison. As such, we aim to show the superiority of our multi-network
architecture regardless of using any tricks to improve the GAN training. In addi-
tion, we also compare our method against the traditional variational autoencoder
architecture [168] (VAE) to show the advantage of our multi-network architecture.
We implement our approach in PyTorch [172] (v1.2.0 with Python 3.7.4) by opti-
mizing the networks using Adam [173] with an initial learning rate lr = 2e−3, and
momentums β1 = 0.5, β2 = 0.999. Our model is optimized based on the weighted
loss L (defined in Equation 4.4) using the weight values λadv = 1, λcon = 50 and
λenc = 1, which were empirically chosen to yield optimum results. (Figure 4.5 (b)).
We train the model for 15, 25, 25 epochs for MNIST, UBA and FFOB datasets,
respectively. Experimentation is performed using a dual-core Intel Xeon E5-2630 v4
processor and NVIDIA GTX Titan X GPU.
4.4 Results
We report results based on the area under the curve (AUC) of the Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC), true positive rate (TPR) as a function of false-positive rate
(FPR) for different points, each of which is a TPR-FPR value for different thresholds.
Figure 4.4 (a) presents the results obtained on MNIST data using three different
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Figure 4.4: Results for MNIST (a) and CIFAR (b) datasets. Variations due to the use of 3
different random seeds are depicted via error bars. All but GANomaly results in (a) were
obtained from [14].
UBA FFOB
Method gun gun-parts knife overall full-weapon
AnoGAN [13] 0.598 0.511 0.599 0.569 0.703
EGBAD [14] 0.614 0.591 0.587 0.597 0.712
GANomaly 0.747 0.662 0.520 0.643 0.882
Table 4.1: AUC results for UBA and FFOB datasets
contemporary models [13, 14, 168]. For each digit chosen as anomalous, our model
achieves higher AUC than EGBAD [14], AnoGAN [13] and variational autoencoder
pipeline VAE [168]. Due to showing its poor performance within a relatively un-
challenging dataset, we do not include VAE in the rest of the experiments.
Figure 4.4 (b) shows the performance of the models trained on the CIFAR10
dataset. We see that our model achieves the best AUC performance for any of
the class chosen as anomalous. The reason for getting relatively lower quantitative
results within this dataset is that for a selected abnormal category, there exists a
normal class that is similar to the abnormal (plane vs bird, cat vs dog, horse vs deer
and car vs truck).
For UBA and FFOB datasets shown in Table 5.2, our model again outperforms
other approaches excluding the case of the knife. The performance of the models
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Figure 4.5: (a) Overall performance of the model based on varying size of the latent vector
z. (b) Impact of weighting the losses on the overall performance. Model is trained on
MNIST dataset with an abnormal digit-2
simplicity, causing an overfit and hence high false positives. For the overall perfor-
mance, however, our approach surpasses the other models, yielding AUC of 0.666
and 0.882 on the UBA and FFOB datasets, respectively.
Figure 4.5 depicts how the choice of hyper-parameters ultimately affect the over-
all performance of the model. In Figure 4.5 (a), we see that the optimal performance
is achieved when the size of the latent vector z is 100 for the MNIST dataset with an
abnormal digit-2. Figure 4.5 (b) demonstrates the impact of tuning the loss func-
tion in Equation 4.4 on the overall performance. The model achieves the highest
AUC when λbce = 1, λrec = 50 and λenc = 1. We empirically observe the same
tuning-pattern for the rest of datasets.
Figure 4.6 provides the histogram of the anomaly scores during the inference
stage (a) and t-SNE visualization of the features extracted from the last convolu-
tional layer of the discriminator network (b). Both of the figures demonstrate a
clear separation within the latent vector z and feature f(.) spaces.
Table 4.2 illustrates the runtime performance of the GAN-based models. Com-
pared to the rest of the approaches, AnoGAN [13] is computationally rather ex-
pensive since the optimization of the latent vector is needed for each example. For
EGBAD [14], we report similar run-time performance to that of the original paper.
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Figure 4.6: (a) Histogram of the scores for both normal and abnormal test samples. (b)
t-SNE visualization of the features extracted from the last conv. layer f(.) of the discrim-
inator
Model MNIST CIFAR DBA FFOB
AnoGAN [13] 7120 7120 7110 7223
EGBAD [14] 8.92 8.71 8.88 8.87
GANomaly 2.79 2.21 2.66 2.53
Table 4.2: Computational performance of the approaches. (Runtime in terms of millisec-
ond)
time performance of both UBA and FFOB datasets are comparable to MNIST even
though their image and network size are double than that of MNIST.
A set of examples in Figures 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 depict real and fake images that
are respectively the input and output of our model. Left and right columns show
benign and anomaly instances, respectively. Each column shows three image pairs
(real vsreconstructed) for MNIST and CIFAR-10 and two pairs for DBA and FFOB
datasets. Here, we qualitatively evaluate the performance of the model by checking
the reconstruction error and expect the model to produce large reconstruction error
for abnormal examples.
Figure 4.7 demonstrate MNIST examples, where two consecutive row shows the
input and reconstructed samples for benign and abnormal digit. For the first two
rows, for instance, the model is trained to detect the abnormal digit-0. As can be
seen from the figure, the reconstruction error is low for both benign and abnormal
samples, which contradicts to our hypothesis. This is due to the unchallenging
77
Benign Anomaly
Figure 4.7: Randomly selected real and generated samples containing normal and abnormal
objects in MNIST dataset. The model is capable of generating abnormal samples; and
detecting the abnormality within the latent vector space.
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Figure 4.8: Randomly selected real and generated samples containing normal and abnormal
objects in CIFAR dataset. The model fails to generate abnormal samples not being trained
on.
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Figure 4.9: Randomly selected real and generated samples containing normal and abnormal
objects in DBA dataset. The model fails to generate abnormal samples not being trained
on.
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Figure 4.10: Randomly selected real and generated samples containing normal and abnor-
mal objects in FFOB dataset. The model fails to generate abnormal samples not being
trained on.
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nature of MNIST, where the model learns adequate information to generate the
classes not seen during training. Despite this low reconstruction error, the model is
capable of detecting abnormality within its latent space.
Figure 4.8 depicts the reconstruction performance of the model for CIFAR-10
dataset, where the car class is chosen as the abnormal class. The figure demon-
strates that the model can reconstruct benign images, while struggles to generate
the abnormal class. Closer inspection to the fifth row in the figure, for instance,
shows that the reconstruction error for truck, ship and horse classes are rather low,
while being large for car samples. The figure shows the model’s potential to detect
abnormalities.
Similar to the case of CIFAR-10, Figure 4.9 represents the test images for UBA
dataset. It is apparent that the reconstruction error for benign samples are low (Fig-
ure 4.9 left), while being large for the abnormal instances (Figure 4.9 right). Figure
4.10 demonstrates similar patterns, where the model’s capability to reconstruct ab-
normal examples are rather limited. Unlike Figure 4.9, the reconstruction error for
benign samples are relatively higher than that of Figure 4.9. This is because, being
cluttered full X-ray images, FFOB is a more challenging dataset than UBA, which
consists of X-ray image patches. Despite this complexity of the FFOB dataset, the
model still copes well with detecting the abnormality.
Overall, these results purport that our approach yields both statistically and
computationally superior results than leading state-of-the-art approaches [13, 14].
4.5 Conclusion
Despite achieving superior performance, supervised CNN-based object classification
and detection methods depend on large, annotated and balanced datasets. Within
the X-ray security screening context, however, anomalous objects are not commonly
encountered, exemplary data of such can be challenging to obtain, and the nature of
the abnormality may evolve due to a range of external factors. Such issues weaken
the generalizability of the supervised CNN models and hence limits their use within
any deployment.
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To tackle the issues stated above, this chapter proposes an unsupervised anomaly
detection algorithm that captures the distribution of the normal samples during
training. Within the inference, the model detects the abnormality based on the
deviation of the samples from the distribution of the normal data examples. The
proposed model utilizes a novel adversarial training scheme such that the genera-
tor network comprises an encoder-decoder-encoder architectural model for superior
data capturing and reconstruction. Experimentation across different benchmarks of
varying complexity such as [167, 171], and within the operational anomaly detec-
tion context of X-ray security screening [15, 49], shows that the proposed method
outperforms both contemporary state-of-the-art GAN-based [13,14] and traditional
autoencoder-based anomaly detection approaches [60] with generalization ability to
any anomaly detection task.
Despite its superior performance improvement over the state-of-the-art tech-
niques, there are certain limitations of the proposed model. As shown in Figures
4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10, the model suffers from huge reconstruction error such that the
quality of the generated samples is worse than the original input images. In addition
to this reconstruction issue, there is also network redundancy within the network
pipeline that the encoder E() and the discriminator D() networks have different
parametrization despite having the same architecture. By addressing these issues,
the next chapter introduces a new unsupervised anomaly detection, which overall
yields superior detection performance.
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CHAPTER 5
Skip-GANomaly: Skip Connected and Adversarially Trained
Encoder-Decoder Anomaly Detection
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 introduces a novel, unsupervised anomaly detection method with adver-
sarial training that outperforms the previous state-of-the-art [13, 14]. Despite this
significant gain, the proposed model has the following limitations: (i) incapability
of generating high-quality normal images, (ii) parameter redundancy due to having
two exact same network with different parametrization (See Figure 4.2).
Motivated by the promising performance and limitations of the model outlined
in Chapter 4, this chapter introduces a new method for anomaly detection via adver-
sarial training. The proposed model addresses the twofold issues of Chapter 4: first,
to alleviate the high reconstruction issue, the model utilizes skip-connected encoder-
decoder (convolutional neural) network architecture. While adversarial training has
shown the promise of GAN in this domain [49], skip-connections within such UNet-
style (encoder-decoder) [174] generator networks are known to enable the multi-scale
capture of image space detail with sufficient capacity to generate high-quality nor-
mal images drawn from the distribution the model has learned. Second, the model
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Sub-sample of the X-ray screening application dataset used to train the pro-
posed approach: (a) training data contains normal samples only, while the test data (b)
comprises both normal and abnormal samples.
also tackles with the parameter redundancy issue by learning latent representation
within the discriminator network. Similar to [13,14,49], the proposed approach also
seeks to learn the normal distribution in both the image and latent spaces via a GAN
generator-discriminator paradigm. The discriminator network not only forces the
generator to learn an improved model of the distribution but also works as a feature
extractor such that it learns the reconstruction of the normal distribution within
a higher-dimensional latent space. Evaluation of the model on various established
benchmarks [15,171] statistically illustrates superior anomaly detection task perfor-
mance over prior work by Schlegl et al. [13], Zenati et al. [14] and GANomaly [49]
(Chapter 4). Subsequently, the main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• high-quality reconstruction — a generator network utilising skip-connected
encoder-decoder convolutional network architecture that produces high-quality
images and that eliminates high-reconstruction errors reported in Chapter 4.
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• unique latent-representation learning — a discriminator network that is capa-
ble of both identifying real vs. fake images and learning latent representation
for normal and abnormal distributions, which overall eliminates the parameter
redundancy issue outlined in Chapter 4.
• efficacy — an efficient anomaly detection algorithm achieving quantitatively
and qualitatively superior performance against prior state-of-the-art approaches
[13,14,49].
In addition, the chapter proposes a simple and effective algorithm such that the
results could be reproduced via the code1 made publicly available.
5.2 Proposed Approach
Before proceeding to explain our proposed approach, it is important to introduce
the fundamental concepts.
Problem Definition
This work proposes an unsupervised approach for anomaly detection.
We adversarially train our proposed convolutional network architecture in an
unsupervised manner such that the conceptual model is trained on normal samples
only, and yet tested on both normal and abnormal ones. Mathematically, we define
and formulate our problem as the following:
As also discussed in Chapter 4, we are given a large training set D and a test set
D̂ such that D = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xm, ym)} contains m normal samples, where
yi = 0 denotes the normal class. The test set D̂ = {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), ..., (xm, ym)}
comprises n normal and abnormal samples, where yi ∈ [0, 1] for normal and abnormal
classes, respectively. In practical settings, m n.
Based on the dataset defined above, we train our model f on D and evaluate
its performance on D̂. The training objective (J ) of the model f is to capture the
distribution of D within not only image space but also hidden latent vector space.
















Figure 5.2: Overview of the proposed adversarial training procedure.
Capturing the distribution within both dimensions by minimizing J enables the
network to learn higher and lower level features that are unique to normal images.
We hypothesize that defining an anomaly score A(.) based on the training objective
J would yield minimal anomaly scores for training samples —normal samples, but
greater scores for abnormal images. Hence a higher anomaly score A(x) for a given
sample x would indicate whether x is normal or abnormal concerning the distribution
of normal data learned by f from D during training.
Pipeline
Similar to GANomaly [49] pipeline described in Section 4.2, the proposed approach
comprises a generator (G) and a discriminator (D) network, as depicted in Figure
5.2. Unlike GANomaly [49] that utilizes an encoder-decoder-encoder generator net-
work, this work adopts a bow-tie architecture for the network G by using an encoder
(GE) and a decoder (GD) network. The encoder network captures the distribution
of the input data by mapping the image (x + n) into lower-dimensional latent rep-
resentation (z) such that GE : x+ n→ z, where x ∈ Rw×h×c, n is a Gaussian noise
with random mean and standard deviation and z ∈ Rd. As illustrated in Figure

















Figure 5.3: Details of the proposed network architecture.
BatchNorm layers as well as LeakyReLU activation function and outputs the latent
representation z, which is also known as the bottleneck features that carries a unique
representation of the input.
Being symmetrical to GE, the decoder network GD up-samples the latent vector
z back to the input image dimension and reconstructs the output, denoted as x̂. In
contrast to GANomaly [49], here the decoder GD adopts skip-connection approach
such that each down-sampling layer in the encoder network is concatenated to its
corresponding up-sampling decoder layer (Figure 5.3). This use of skip connections
provides substantial advantages via direct information transfer between the layers,
preserving both local and global (multi-scale) information, and hence yielding better
reconstruction.
The second network within the pipeline, shown in Figure 5.3 (b), called discrimi-
nator (D), predicts the class label of the given input. Like GANomaly [49], its initial
task is to classify real images (x) from the fake ones (x̂), generated by the network
G. The network architecture of the discriminator D follows the same structure as
the discriminator of the DCGAN approach presented in [169]. In addition to being
a classifier, the network D is also used as a feature extractor such that the latent
representation of the input image x and the reconstructed image x̂ is computed.
Learning the latent space representation within the network D is another novelty of
the proposed approach compared to the previous approaches [13, 14,49].
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Based on this multi-network architecture, explained above and shown in Figure
5.3, the next section describes the proposed training objective and inference scheme.
5.2.1 Training Objective
As explained in Section 5.2, the idea proposed in this work is to train the model
only on normal samples, and test on both normal and abnormal ones. Similar
to the one explained in Section 4.2.1, the motivation is that we expect the model
to be able to correctly reconstruct the normal samples either in image or latent
vector space. The hypothesis is that the network is conversely expected to fail to
reconstruct the abnormal samples as it is never trained on such abnormal examples.
Hence, for abnormal samples, one would expect a higher loss for the reconstruction
of the output image x̂ or the latent representation ẑ. To validate this, we propose
to combine three loss values (Adversarial, Contextual, Latent—Encoder), each of
which has its contribution to make within the overall training objective.
Adversarial Loss
Unlike GANomaly [49] that uses feature matching loss [170], this model utilises the
adversarial loss [164] to maximize the reconstruction capability for the normal images
x during training. This loss, shown in Equation 5.1, ensures that the network G
reconstructs a normal image x to x̂ as realistically as possible, while the discriminator
network D classifies the real and the (fake) generated samples. The task here is to












The adversarial loss defined in Section 5.2.1 forces the model to generate realistic
samples but does not guarantee to learn contextual information regarding the input.
As proposed for GANomaly [49] in Section 4.2.1, we apply an L1 loss between the
input x and the reconstructed output x̂ to explicitly learn this contextual information
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to sufficiently capture the input data distribution for the normal samples. This loss
component ensures that the model is capable of generating contextually similar






With the adversarial and contextual losses defined above, the model can generate
realistic and contextually similar images. In addition to these objectives, we aim to
reconstruct latent representations for the input x and the generated normal samples
x̂ as similar as possible. This is to ensure that the network is capable of producing
contextually sound latent representations for common examples.
Unlike GANomaly [49] that minimises the latent representation by taking the L2
norm of the bottleneck features of the input (z = GE(x)) and the encoded features
of the generated image (ẑ = E(x̂)), this model uses the final convolutional layer of
the discriminator D, and extract the features of x and x̂ to reconstruct their latent
representations as z = f(x) and ẑ = f(x̂) (See Figures 4.2 and 5.2). The latent




Finally, total training objective becomes a weighted sum of the losses above.
L = λadvLadv + λconLcon + λencLenc, (5.4)
where λadv, λcon and λenc are the weighting parameters adjusting the dominance of
the individual loss components within the overall objective function.
5.2.2 Inference
To find the anomalies during the testing and subsequent deployment, we adopt the
anomaly score, proposed in [13] and also employed in [14]. For a given test image
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ẋ, its anomaly score becomes:
A(ẋ) = λR(ẋ) + (1− λ)L(ẋ), (5.5)
where R(ẋ) is the reconstruction score measuring the contextual similarity between
the input and the generated images based on Equation 5.2. L(ẋ) denotes the latent
representation score measuring the difference between the input and generated im-
ages based on Equation 5.3. λ is the weighting parameter controlling the relative
importance of the score functions.
Based on Equation 5.5, we then compute the anomaly scores for each individual
test sample ẋ in the test set D̂, and denote as anomaly score vector A such that
A = {Ai : A(ẋi), ẋi ∈ D̂}. Finally, following the same procedure proposed in [49], we
also apply feature scaling to A to scale the anomaly scores within the probabilistic





Equation 5.6 finally yields an anomaly score vector Â for the final evaluation of
the test set D̂, which is explained in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.4.
5.3 Experimental Setup
This section introduces the datasets, training and implementational details as well
as the evaluation criteria used within the experimentation.
5.3.1 Datasets
To demonstrate the proof of concept of the proposed approach, we follow the same
experimental setup presented in Chapter 4 and validate our model on CIFAR-10
[171], UBA [49] and FFOB [15] datasets.
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5.3.2 Training Details
The training loss L from Equation 5.4 is optimized via Adam [173] optimizer with an
initial learning rate lr = 2e−3 with a lambda decay, and momentums β1 = 0.5, β2 =
0.999. The weighting parameters of L is chosen as λadv = 1, λcon = 40 and λenc = 1,
empirically shown to yield the optimal performance (See Figure 5.5). The model is
initially set to be trained for 15 epochs; however, in most cases, it learns sufficient
information within fewer training cycles. Therefore, we save the parameters of the
network when the performance of the model starts to decrease since this reduction
is a strong indication of over-fitting. The model is implemented using PyTorch [172]
(v1.2.0, Python 3.7.4, CUDA 10.1 and CUDNN 7.6). Experiments are performed
using an NVIDIA Titan X GPU.
5.3.3 Evaluation
Similar to the previous work [13,14,49], the performance of the model is evaluated by
the area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) [175],
a function plotted by the true positive rates (TPR) and false positive rates (FPR)
with varying threshold values (as per prior work in the field [13,14,49]).
5.4 Results
Before presenting results for the full pipeline, it is essential to show how hyper-
parameters affect the overall performance. Figure 5.4 demonstrates the impact of
the dimension of the latent space. The x-axis shows the CIFAR-10 classes when
chosen abnormal vs normal (e.g. bird vs rest) with various dimensionality of z and
the y-axis depicts the corresponding AUC performance. We see that in eight out of
ten cases, nz = 100 yields the highest AUC. We ,therefore, set nz = 100 for the rest
of the experimentation.
Similar to Figure 5.4, we observe the performance change by tuning the param-
eters of the overall loss function shown in Equation 5.4. Figure 5.5 illustrates for
the abnormal case of car from CIFAR-10 that weighting parameters significantly
influences the overall performance. Observing the similar performance outcome for
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Figure 5.4: Hyper-parameter tuning for the model. The model achieves the most optimum
performance when nz = 100.
the rest of the classes and datasets, we choose the following weighting parameters
for Equation 5.4: λadv = 40, λrec = 1 and λenc = 1. Again, the rest of the results
presented in this section are based on these parameters.
For the CIFAR-10 dataset, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.6 demonstrate that with the
exception of abnormal classes bird and dog, the proposed model yields superior
results to the prior work.
CIFAR-10
Model bird car cat deer dog frog horse plane ship truck
AnoGAN [13] 0.411 0.492 0.399 0.335 0.393 0.321 0.399 0.516 0.567 0.511
EGBAD [14] 0.383 0.514 0.448 0.374 0.481 0.353 0.526 0.577 0.413 0.555
GANomaly [49] 0.510 0.631 0.587 0.593 0.628 0.683 0.605 0.633 0.616 0.617
Proposed 0.448 0.953 0.607 0.602 0.615 0.931 0.788 0.797 0.659 0.907
Table 5.1: AUC results for CIFAR-10 dataset.
Table 5.2 presents the experimental results for UBA and FFOB datasets. It is
apparent from this table that the proposed method significantly outperforms the
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Figure 5.5: Hyper-parameter tuning for the model. The model achieves the most optimum
performance when λadv = 1, λcon=40 = 1 and λcon = 1.
the prior work is 0.599 for the most challenging abnormality case – knife, while the
method proposed here achieves AUC of 0.904.
UBA FFOB
Method gun gun-parts knife overall full-weapon
AnoGAN [13] 0.598 0.511 0.599 0.569 0.703
EGBAD [14] 0.614 0.591 0.587 0.597 0.712
GANomaly [49] 0.747 0.662 0.520 0.643 0.882
Proposed 0.972 0.945 0.904 0.940 0.903
Table 5.2: AUC results for UBA and FFOB datasets.
Figures 5.9 and ?? depicts exemplary test images for the datasets used in the
experimentation. A significant result emerging from the examples presented within
the Figures is that the proposed model is capable of generating both normal and
abnormal reconstructed outputs at test time, meaning that it captures the distribu-
tion of both domains. This is probably due to the use of skip connections enabling
reconstruction even for the abnormal test samples.
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Proposed GANomaly EGBAD AnoGAN
Figure 5.6: AUC results for CIFAR-10 dataset. Shaded areas in the plot represent varia-
tions due to the use of 3 random seeds.
of Table 5.2, reveal that abnormality detection is successfully made in latent object
space of the model that emerges from our adversarial training over the proposed
skip-connected architecture.
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 show the histogram plot (a) of the normal and abnormal
scores for the test data, and the t-SNE plot (b) of the normal and abnormal features
extracted from the last convolutional layer (f(.)) of the discriminator (see Figure
5.3). Closer inspection of the figures reveals that the model yields promising sep-
aration within both the output anomaly (reconstruction) score and the preceding
convolutional feature spaces.
Figure 5.9 and ?? show that the proposed model successfully classifies the im-
ages as abnormal. It is important to note that the generator network is capable
of producing abnormal examples. Apart from particular finer details and certain
checkerboard artefacts on some images, the generated samples look almost the same
as the real ones. Despite this low-reconstruction error on abnormal samples, the
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Figure 5.7: (a) Histogram of the normal and abnormal scores for the test data.
Normal
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Figure 5.8: (b) t-SNE plot of the 1000 subsampled normal and abnormal features extracted
from the last convolutional layer (f(.)) of the discriminator (Figure 5.3).
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latent space.
Figure 5.10, on the other hand, illustrates exemplary images, where the model
misclassifies normal and abnormal samples. Some of these misclassifications stem
from mislabeled examples (left and right images of the top two rows and the third
row). Misclassified examples on the fourth row are because the model labels the
metallic objects as abnormal. Examples on the fourth row, finally, are incorrectly
classified as benign since the model misses tiny firearm-parts.
Overall, these results indicate that the proposed approach yields superior anomaly
detection performance to the model presented in Chapter 4 and to the previous
state-of-the-art approaches [13, 14].
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter introduces an anomaly detection method designed to address the limi-
tations of GANomaly [49], presented in Chapter 4. Despite the superior results, the
high-reconstruction error of normal/abnormal samples and redundant parametrisa-
tion limits GANomaly for deployment.
The model presented in this chapter, on the other hand, tackles with these issues
by (i) utilising skip-connected networks [174] that reconstruct high-quality image
outputs, (ii) removing the second encoder network E from GANomaly (See Figure
4.2 upper right) and learning the latent space representation within the discriminator
network (Figure 5.3).
Evaluating the model on various datasets such as CIFAR-10 [171], UBA [49]
and FFOB [15] show that the proposed model significantly outperforms Schlegl et
al. [13], Zenati et al. [14] and GANomaly [49] (Chapter 4). The empirical findings
in this study provide an insight into the generalization capability of the proposed
method to any anomaly detection task.
Despite these promising results, certain issues need further research. As discussed
in Section 5.4, and depicted in Figures 5.9, ?? and 5.10, the generator network is
capable of producing realistic samples even for abnormal images, an indication that
the distribution of the abnormal samples is a subset of the normal distribution
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learned during the training stage. Although the discriminator network can classify
the abnormal images within the latent space, further research could concentrate on
a training regime such that the generator network learns the normal distribution
from a small subset of normal data in order not to capture the distribution of the
abnormality.
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Figure 5.9: Randomly selected normal and abnormal test images. The generator has a
tendency to blur out the images not seen during training.
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Figure 5.10: Randomly selected normal and abnormal test images. In most cases, the




Recent developments in the field of machine and deep learning have led to an in-
creased interest in automated X-ray security screening systems. Despite the consid-
erable literature grown up, the primary scope of the prior work is mainly limited to
classical machine learning or supervised deep learning methods. This thesis initially
gives an overview of such methods and provides a thorough evaluation of the use
of state-of-the-art deep learning algorithms within classification and detection tasks
in X-ray security imaging. By employing the transfer learning paradigm, the thesis
shows that the use of supervised deep learning algorithms significantly outperforms
conventional learning techniques. Despite the performance gain, limitations of the
supervised deep learning approaches, stemming from imbalanced X-ray datasets (be-
nign  threat) are also pointed out, which ultimately transitions the scope of the
thesis towards deep unsupervised methods.
To address the severe class imbalance issue, the thesis introduces two novel un-
supervised anomaly detection algorithm whereby the models are trained on benign
samples to learn the distribution of the non-threat material and are tested on both
benign and threat images to detect illicit materials as outliers. The following section
outlines the main contributions of the thesis.
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6.1 Contributions
Chapter 3 exhaustively evaluates the use of state-of-the-art classification architec-
tures against the prior work in the field. The work presented here compares end-
to-end transfer-learned CNN classification and the final stage SVM classification on
the extracted CNN features as well as SVM classification on conventional hand-
crafted features. Empirical findings indicate that fine-tuned CNN features yield
superior performance to conventional hand-crafted features on object classification
tasks within this context. Overall, the highest accuracy is achieved by the AlexNet
features trained with Support Vector Machine (SVM) classifier (0.994) on the firearm
classification problem.
In addition to the classification task, an additional set of experiments compares
the region based object detection/localization strategies of [10,142] against the prior
strategies proposed in [99,150]. Contrasting performance results are obtained against
the prior published studies of [8,9] over a comprehensive dataset of 11, 627 examples
making this one of the largest combined X-ray object detection and classification
study in the literature to date. With the use of YOLOv2 [12], using input images of
size 544×544, we achieve 0.885 mean average precision (mAP) for a six-class object
detection problem. The same approach with an input of size 416× 416 yields 0.974
mAP for the two-class firearm detection problem and requires approximately 100ms
per image.
Moreover, the evaluation is strengthened further by using UK government eval-
uation dataset (CAST) [15]. VGG16 [5] network yields 0.999 accuracy on Full
Firearm vs Operational Benign dataset extracted from the CAST dataset. Overall,
the Chapter identifies the classification approaches and the detection strategies that
outperform the prior work of [9, 84,99] in a supervised fashion.
Addressing the difficulties of supervised learning-based methods, and imbalanced
nature of X-ray security imaging datasets, Chapter 4 presents a generic unsupervised
anomaly detection architecture comprising an adversarial training framework. The
proposed approach uses single colour images as the input drawn only from normal
(non-anomalous) training examples. Unlike the previous algorithms requiring two-
stage training, the proposed approach has single-stage training and is both efficient
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for model training and later inference (run-time testing). The novelty of the pro-
posed algorithm comes from the adversarial autoencoder scheme within an encoder-
decoder-encoder pipeline, capturing the training data distribution within both image
and latent vector space. An adversarial training architecture such as this, practi-
cally based on only normal training data examples, produces superior performance
to the prior work [13,14] over challenging benchmark problems [15,167,171].
Chapter 5 further extends the anomaly detection algorithm presented in Chap-
ter 4 via adversarial training over a skip-connected encoder-decoder (convolutional
neural) network architecture. Whilst adversarial training has shown the promise
of GAN in this domain, as demonstrated in Chapter 4, skip-connections within
such UNet-style (encoder-decoder) [174] generator networks are known to enable
the multi-scale capture of image space detail with sufficient capacity to generate
high-quality normal images drawn from the distribution the model has learned. The
proposed approach also seeks to learn the normal distribution in both the image
and latent spaces via a GAN generator-discriminator paradigm. The discriminator
network not only forces the generator to learn an improved model of the distribu-
tion but also works as a feature extractor such that it learns the reconstruction
of the normal distribution within a lower-dimensional latent space This proposed
pipeline outperforms the previous work [13,14,49] on challenging anomaly-detection
problems [15,167,171].
Overall, this thesis aims to initially provide an overview to the supervised deep
learning methods, and advance the literature by proposing two novel unsuper-
vised anomaly detection algorithms for the classification of the threat items within
X-ray security imaging. The evaluation of deep supervised approaches demon-
strates promising detection performance in case of having a well-balanced and an-
notated datasets. The second significant finding of the thesis is that unsupervised
deep anomaly detection algorithms could yield encouraging performance, where the
datasets are highly biased towards certain classes and lack annotations. Taken to-
gether, these results suggest that the use of the proposed algorithms could help
human operators to detect threat items, strengthening security screening. The gen-
eralisability of these results is subject to certain limitations, as discussed in Section
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6.2. Further studies need to be carried out in order to further investigate the limi-
tations.
6.2 Limitations and Future Work
Despite the promising performance of the proposed approaches, there are still some
identifiable limitations. This section discusses the challenges and future directions
based on the weaknesses and strengths of the current approaches presented in this
thesis and the broader literature, including concurrent work to that presented here.
6.2.1 Data
Although the use of transfer learning improves the performance of small X-ray
datasets, the lack of large datasets limits contemporary deep model training. Rel-
atively large datasets in the field such as SIXray, FFOB are highly biased towards
certain classes, limiting to train reliable supervised methods. Hence, it is essential to
build large, homogeneous, realistic and publicly available datasets, collected either
by (i) manually scanning numerous bags with different objects and orientations in a
lab environment or (ii) generating synthetic datasets via contemporary algorithms.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both methods. Although manual
data collection enables to gather realistic samples with the flexibility to produce
any combination, it is rather expensive, requiring tremendous human effort and
time.
Synthetic dataset generation, on that hand, is another method, currently achieved
by TIP [68,69] or GAN [44,106]. A recent study empirically demonstrates that using
a TIP dataset for a detection task adversely impacts the detection performance [176].
In future work, therefore, more advanced algorithms such as image translation or
domain adaptation [138, 177] could be considered such that the model would learn
to translate between benign and threat domains, which overall would yield superior
projection/translation to TIP.
The literature has also seen another type of synthetic datasets generated by GAN
algorithms. The limitation of current GAN datasets [44, 106], however, is that the
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models are currently capable of producing only objects but full X-ray images. More-
over, the quality of the generated images is far from being realistic. Further studies,
taking these issues into account, will need to be undertaken. It might be feasible to
create more realistic X-ray images by using contemporary GAN algorithms [178].
6.2.2 Exploiting Multiple-View Information
Existing research recognises the critical role played by multiple-view imagery, es-
pecially when the detection of an object from a particular viewpoint is challeng-
ing [45, 46, 125]. Two key studies [45] and [46] investigate utilising multiple-view
integration inside/outside a CNN. Despite the incremental performance improve-
ment reported, further work is required to investigate other possible ways to utilise
multiple-view imagery better.
6.2.3 Generalization Ability – Transferring Between Domains
As pointed out in [41] and [144], transferring models between different scanners could
be challenging due to the unknown intrinsics of the scanners. Future work would
utilize domain adaptation [177], where the source domain contains images from one
scanner, and the target domain would be of another X-ray scanner. Training with
even unbalanced datasets would learn the intrinsic, and map from one to the other.
6.2.4 Improving Unsupervised Anomaly Detection Approaches
As explained in Section 2.4.1, the current datasets available within the literature
are highly imbalanced such that a number of benign samples are significantly larger
than threat images [49–51].
To address this issue, Chapters 4 and 5 employ unsupervised algorithms trained
on only benign samples, and tested on both benign and threat examples. The pri-
mary idea here is to learn to reconstruct only normal samples within the image
and latent spaces such that the model would fail to reconstruct abnormal images.
However, more research on this topic needs to be undertaken to devise better re-
construction techniques that thoroughly learn the characteristics of the normality
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from which the abnormality would be detected. In addition, current techniques pro-
posed in these chapters scores the anomalies based on a threshold that is manually
chosen and is data specific. For a better anomaly detection without needing for
manual thresholding, therefore, more sophisticated classification approaches could
be proposed.
6.2.5 Use of the Material Information
In dual-energy X-ray systems attenuation between high and low energies yields a
unique value for different materials, which could be utilised further for more accurate
object classification/detection [179,180]. Even though recent research [104,134] have
examined the use of material information, the research outcome present inconsistent
results. Morris et al. [134], for instance, show that Z-effective, when trained itself,
achieves the highest detection performance. Rogers et al. [104], on the other hand,
demonstrate that networks fed with 4-channel inputs ({− logL,L,H,− logH}) yield
the highest classification accuracy. Hence, a further study thoroughly investigating
the material information is suggested.
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APPENDIX A
Fundamentals of Deep Learning Approaches in X-ray Security
Imaging
This section briefly introduces the recent deep learning approaches employed within
the X-ray security domain. It is important to note that the scope of the deep learning
approaches discussed here is limited to those only used in X-ray security imaging.
A.1 Background on Neural Networks
One of the fundamental neural network approaches, called multi-layer perceptron
consists of a single layer h or stack of n multiple layers h = {h0, h1, . . . hn}, each
of which comprises of set of neurons, activations (a) and non-linear transformation
(σ). An activation of a layer i, denoted as a(i) is the linear combination of the input
x(i−1) and parameters θ(i) = {W(i), b(i)}, where W(i) and b(i) are the weights and the
biases such that a(i) = wTi x(i−1) + b(i). The ith layer h(i) is a function, where a non-
liner transformation σ(i) is applied to the activation a(i) such that h(i) = σ(i)(a(i)).
Hence, the output of the ith layer is h(i) = σ(i)(wTi x + b).
Overall, an n layer network, comprises of n hidden layers, where h = {h0, h1, . . . hn},
and parameters Θ = {W ,B}, whereW = {w1,w2, . . . ,wn} and B = {b1, b2, . . . , bn}.
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The overall network f is the composition of the hidden layers such that
f(x; Θ) = f(hn ◦ . . . ◦ h1 ◦ h0). (A.1.1)
The final layer h(n) of the model f outputs C vectors, where C is the number of
classes within the dataset D.
For an n layer network f , the output activation is a(n) = wTnx(n−1) + b(n). For a
simpler notation let z = a(n). The network outputs C vectors z = {z1, z2, . . . , zC},
where C is the number of classes, and each z is the feature encoding for class j.
The next step is to classify the input x, based on its feature encoding z. softmax is
the most common function used to classify the feature encoding in neural networks.
A softmax function takes an input feature encoding z, and returns a probabilistic
output, representing the likelihood of the input belonging to class j. Hence, the
softmax output of z for class j is:




, j = 1, . . . , C. (A.1.2)
The performance of a task is optimised via an objective (loss) function. In a
classification task, for instance, cross-entropy is used to measure the performance
of the probabilistic output of the softmax function. Cross-entropy, also known as
log-loss, penalises the model as the predicted probability deviates from the ground-










where yc is a binary label indicating whether the label c is correct for the sample,
and pc is the probability predicted for the class c by softmax.
A.2 Convolutional Neural Networks – CNN
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) are considered to be modern neural networks
with key distinctions. Unlike MLP that connect all neurons to other neurons, which
is impractical, CNN uses local receptive fields, also known as filter or kernels, that
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spatially connect neurons to their local region. The use of local receptive fields makes
CNN equivariant to image translations. Each layer h consists of K kernels with
weights W = {w1,w2, . . . ,wK} and biases B = {b1, b2, . . . , bK}. The second major
difference is weight sharing that shares weights of the filters W across individual
feature map of each layer h. Weight sharing radically decreases the number of
















































Input Pixels 3x3 Kernel Output Pixels
Figure A.1: 2D Convolutional operation. Output is the linear combination of n×n kernel
and the corresponding pixels slid through the entire input.
Another difference is that, within the network, convolutional layers are usually
followed by pooling layers which down-samples the current representation (image)
and hence reduces the number of parameters carried forward in-addition to improv-











































(a) Network Before Dropout (b) Network After Dropout
Figure A.2: Application of dropout, whereby the neurons are randomly removed from the
network to avoid over-fitting.
The high-level of parametrisation, and hence representational capacity, make
CNN susceptible to over-fitting in the traditional sense. The use of dropout [7],
whereby hidden neurons are randomly removed during the training process, is used
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to avoid over-fitting such that performance dependence on individual network ele-
ments is reduced in favour of cumulative error reduction and representational re-
sponsibility for the problem space.
The design of deep CNN poses instability issues during training. The use of
batch normalisation, called BatchNorm, [181], whereby its non-linearity normalises
the input for each hidden layer resolves the stability issues. For the ith hidden layer







where σ is the non-linearity function, and wTi x(i−1) is activation a(i). BatchNorm





where E[a(i)] and V[a(i)] are the mean and the variance of the activation a(i),
respectively. Normalising the outputs of the layer based on the above equations
minimises the massive gradients during the optimisation, and hence leads to faster
convergence. All of the unique differences of CNN listed above make them much
more efficient and reliable compared to traditional MLP. The following subsections
introduce well-known CNN strategies proposed for classification, detection, segmen-
tation, and also applied within X-ray security imaging.
A.3 Supervised CNN Architectures
A.3.1 Classification Architectures
This section explores the contemporary classification strategies proposed during the
deep learning era, and applied within X-ray security imaging.
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AlexNet
Similar to [54] but deeper and wider, this network is of 5 conv layers with 11 × 11
receptive filters and 3 fc layers, and 60 million parameters in total. To eliminate the
network’s tendency to over-fitting, caused by the high number of parametrisation,
the network employs the use of dropout, by randomly removing neurons during the
training. Besides, the network utilises ReLUs for non-linearity to accelerate the
training process.
VGG
Following the AlexNet’s breakthrough within the field, Simonyan and Zisserman
(VGG) [5] investigate the depth on classification performance by designing CNN
via stacking convolutional layers with small 3 × 3 receptive fields with a stride of
1. Small receptive fields increase non-linearity of the network but decrease the total
number of the parameters of the network. This design choice is shown to improve
state-of-the-art significantly.
ResNet
Proposed by He et al. [1], this architecture is also designed to train deeper networks
via its residual connections. The difficulty of training deep networks is that the
training becomes unstable as the network goes deeper, which is due to losing the
gradients of the input. He et al. propose a residual connection approach that
forward-passes input to a stack of two convolutional layers (residual) and sums it
with the input (identity). With the residual connection, the network not only keeps
the gradient of the input as it goes deeper, but also it learns the residuals to be the
same as the input. Empirical evidence demonstrates that ResNet could be trained
up to 1000 layers.
Inception
Instead of only deepening, Szegedy et al. [152] design a network by widening the
architecture. For each layer, the network uses three different filter sizes (i.e., 1× 1,
3×3, 5×5) and 3×3 max pooling layer. The overall network is designed to be upto
22 layers. This design overcomes the scaling issue of the objects within the image.
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The next version of the paper, named InceptionV2 [141], considers factorizing the
receptive fields such that n × n filter is reformulated as the stack of 1 × n and
n × 1 filters, found to be 33% cheaper. The third version of the network utilises
RMSProp [182], 7 × 7 factorized filters, BatchNorm [181] and label smoothing to
avoid over-fitting. The final modification made to the network [147] is to use residual
blocks as proposed in [1].
A.3.2 Detection Architectures
Here we introduce state-of-the-art object detection strategies utilized in X-ray secu-
rity imaging.
Sliding Window-based CNN
As shown in Figure A.3a, this classical object detection approach consists of two
main stages: (i) object proposal (ii) object classification. The first stage generates
objects of interests via a fixed-sized n×n window slides over the image horizontally
and vertically. One issue of using a fixed size window is large objects within the
image does not fit within the frame. A possible solution to overcome this issue is to
use image pyramids by a multi-scale sampling of the image and subsequent image
interpolation of window regions at differing scale to a fixed size classification region
input size.
Faster Region-based CNN (F-RCNN)
Proposed by Ren et al. [10], and depicted in Figure A.3, F-RCNN is designed to have
two sub-networks: (i) Region Proposal Network and (ii) Fast RCNN network [16].
RPN network generates objects of interests with varying anchors by sliding a 3× 3
window through the convolutional feature map, shared with the Fast RCNN sub-
network (Figure A.3b). Based on the feature map from the convolutional layer, a
set of fully connected layers predicts the bounding box and objectness score of the
region (an object or background). The Region of Interest (RoI) pooling layer then
resizes the regions of interests generated by the RPN with varying aspect ratios. fc






































Figure A.3: Region-based fully convolutional neural network (R-FCN), proposed by [10],
removes fully-connected fc layers from F-RCNN to accelerate training.
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Figure A.4: The pipeline of the Single Shot Multi-Box Detector.
Region-based Fully CNN (R-FCN)
Proposed by Dai et al. [11], R-FCN removes the fc layers from F-RCNN to accelerate
the training. The use of fc layers in F-RCNN leads to multiple computations of
the region proposals, which is rather expensive (Figure A.3c). Instead of using
fc layers, R-FCN employs convolutional layers, and a unique scoring map, called
position sensitive scoring map [11], which achieves the similar performance much
more efficiently.
Single Shot Multi-Box Detector (SSD)
As the name suggests, this approach performs object detection with single forward-
pass, without the need for another region proposal sub-network. The architecture
utilises a VGG network by replacing its fc layers with convolutional layers, which
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helps to extract features from multiple scales, and also to reduce the size of the
output for the next layer. The input image is split into 4×4 and 8×8 feature maps,
whereby six manually configured bounding boxes are predicted per feature map
cell. The objective of the architecture is to optimise a loss function that combines
objectness loss and bounding box location loss, computed via a cross-entropy and L1
losses, respectively. Training the model based on the proposed loss yields statistically
reliable and computationally efficient results.
YOLO
Similar to SSD, Redmon et al. [183] also propose a fully convolutional object de-
tection network that needs only one forward-pass (Figure A.4b). Similar to Faster
RCNN, YOLO also utilises several anchors to handle the objects with varying aspect
ratios. Unlike Faster RCNN that uses fixed size anchors, however, YOLO clusters
the ground-truth bounding boxes via k -means clustering to learn the data specific
anchor parameters. Minor modifications to the approach such as BatchNorm and
the use of higher resolution input images together with multi-scale training yield
better detection performance. For instance, the network can train images of sizes
that range between 350×350 to 600×600. It divides the input into 13×13 grid cells,
each of which predicts 5 bounding box coordinates for each anchor. Moreover, for
individual predicted bounding boxes, the network outputs confidence score showing
the similarity between the bounding boxes and the ground truth. Finally, the output
also includes the probability distribution of the classes that the predicted bounding
boxes belong.
RetinaNet
Despite the speed, the downside of single-shot detection algorithms, introduced in
Sections A.3.2 and A.3.2, is the poorer detection performance compared to region-
based approaches explained in Sections A.3.2 and A.3.2. Another issue is the im-
balanced class size as the number of background samples is significantly higher
than objects of interests, which adversely dominates the loss. RetinaNet addresses
these issues and is based on two main contributions: (i) Feature Pyramid Networks
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(FPN), (ii) Focal Loss. The notion of FPN is somewhat similar to UNet [174],
whereby high-level features (first layers) and low-level (higher layers) feature maps
are combined. The advantage of using focal loss during training is the elimination of
class imbalance posed by a large number of background samples. Focal-loss weights
the well-classified samples for the objective function to focus more on hard and in-
teresting examples to learn. Hence the proposed method addresses the issues of the
single-shot methods and achieves comparable performance to region-based detection
approaches.
A.3.3 Segmentation Architectures
The use of segmentation approaches in X-ray security imaging is limited due to the
expense of collecting large segmentation datasets. Recently, there are few recent
research applying segmentation algorithms within this domain, all of which utilises
Mask-RCNN for object segmentation. Proposed by He et al. [3], Mask-RCNN is an
instance segmentation algorithm that simultaneously performs detection and seg-
mentation to each object within an image. The proposed approach is composed of
two main stages and utilises two well-established detection and segmentation algo-
rithms. The first stage uses F-RCNN detection strategy to perform object detection
via the box regression and classification layers (Figure A.3b). The second stage is
the mask branch that is a binary mask classifier that classifies each pixel within a
bounding box as a target class (cat, dog, etc.) or background. Combining binary
mask classifier with F-RCNN (Figure A.5) detection module yields state-of-the-art
instance segmentation results.
A.4 Unsupervised CNN Architectures
Previous approaches introduced in Section A.2 are supervised learning techniques
such that the input dataset contains ground-truth labels, and the model is trained
to predict the labels. In some applications, however, the ground-truth labels are
not available within the dataset, also known as unsupervised learning. This section



















Figure A.5: Mask-RCNN pipeline. The architecture simultaneously performs detection
and instance segmentation.
A.4.1 Autoencoders
An autoencoder is an unsupervised neural network that encodes an input x to a
lower-dimensional latent space z, then reconstructs the input from the latent space

















Figure A.6: An autoencoder pipeline. The input is reduced to a smaller dimension, which
is subsequently reconstructed back to its original dimensionality.








Figure A.7: A generative adversarial network. The generator network produces high di-
mensional output from a low-dimensional noise vector, while the discriminator network
classifies the real and reconstructed images
A.4.2 Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
Initially proposed by Goodfellow et al. [164], GAN are unsupervised deep neural
architectures that learn to capture any input data distribution by predicting fea-
tures from an initially hidden representation z. The theory behind GAN are based
on a competition between the two networks within a zero-sum game framework,
as initially used in game theory. The first network, called Generator (G), aims
to generate high dimensional output from a low-dimension latent space, which is
commonly a random noise vector. The use of a decoder-alike network architecture
upsamples the latent vector to a higher-dimensional feature map.
The second network, called Discriminator (D), measures the similarity between
the original input (real) and the generated output (fake). The discriminator net-
work usually adopts an encoder network architecture such that for a given high-
dimensional feature, it predicts its class label. The objective during the training is
that the generator aims to produce as realistic output as possible, while the discrim-
inator tries to classify the two images as real correctly or fake. With optimisation
based on a zero-sum game framework, each network strengthens its prediction ca-
pability until they reach an equilibrium. The task here, hence, is the minimisation
and the maximisation of G and D, respectively. The overall loss function for this
objective is as follows:
min
G
max
D
E
x∼px
[logD(x)] + E
z∼pz
[log(1−D(G(z))]. (A.4.7)
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